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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE FUTURE OF RAIDING: LESSONS IN RAIDING
TACTICS FROM THE INDIAN WARS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT**

by

Corey A. Brunkow

June 2009

Thesis Advisor:
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Anna Simons
Robert O'Connell

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**THE FUTURE OF RAIDING: LESSONS IN RAIDING TACTICS FROM THE
INDIAN WARS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT**

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Major, United States Army
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

The War on Terror is a fight between states and non-state actors. In this struggle, raiding has emerged as an important tactic used to deny enemy safe haven, to kill and capture known terrorists, and to gain vital intelligence to relentlessly pursue terrorists worldwide. Conducting raids is one method that coalition partners must utilize in order to defeat terrorist networks. This thesis specifically explores: how, when, and where raids prove strategically useful; how different forces conduct raids; and which techniques achieve strategic gains via raids. To pre-empt, prevent, and disrupt terrorist organizations from successfully waging their brand of warfare, it is likely that the United States and Coalition partners must continue to pursue raiding operations under certain situations and utilizing modern techniques. This thesis argues, through the study of the Indian Wars from 1800–1890, and law enforcement raiding techniques used against gangs in the United States, that utilizing the appropriate raiding technique at the correct time and place under the appropriate circumstances *can* significantly disrupt or destroy networked terrorist organizations.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The War on Terror is a fight between states and non-state actors. In this struggle, raiding has emerged as an important tactic used to deny enemy safe haven, to kill and capture known terrorists, and to gain vital intelligence to relentlessly pursue terrorists worldwide. Conducting raids is one method that coalition partners must utilize in order to defeat terrorist networks. This thesis specifically explores: how, when, and where raids prove strategically useful; how different forces conduct raids; and which techniques achieve strategic gains via raids. To pre-empt, prevent, and disrupt terrorist organizations from successfully waging their brand of warfare, it is likely that the United States and Coalition partners must continue to pursue raiding operations under certain situations and utilizing modern techniques. This thesis argues, through the study of the Indian Wars from 1800–1890, and law enforcement raiding techniques used against gangs in the United States, that utilizing the appropriate raiding technique at the correct time and place under the appropriate circumstances *can* significantly disrupt or destroy networked terrorist organizations. The working assumption of this thesis is that the enemy is networked, and is not the typical bureaucratically organized conventional military foe. The study concludes that raids conducted by specialized units can more accurately direct the use of violence and more completely gather evidence at targeted locations. Furthermore, the psychological gains associated with raids may prove invaluable in winning the information war against terrorists.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

1. Background

This thesis examines the strategic utility of conducting raids to achieve strategic gains in the war on terrorism. Conducting raids is one method that coalition partners must utilize in order to defeat terrorist networks. This thesis specifically explores: how, when, and where raids prove strategically useful; how different forces conduct raids; and which techniques can be used to achieve strategic gains via raids.

2. Scope and Purpose

The purpose of this project is to identify the value of conducting special commando raids in order to achieve strategic gains against a networked enemy in the Global War on Terrorism. It is intended to explore which kinds of raids are strategically useful, how different agencies conduct raids, and what techniques exist and can be used to achieve strategic results.

Conducting raids has proven to be essential in multi-faced offensive war campaigns throughout history. To pre-empt, prevent, and disrupt terrorist organizations from successfully waging their brand of warfare, it is likely that the United States and Coalition partners must continue to pursue raiding operations under certain situations and utilizing modern techniques. As this thesis will argue, utilizing the appropriate raiding technique at the correct time and place under the appropriate circumstances *can* significantly disrupt or destroy networked terrorist organizations. The working assumption of this thesis is that the enemy is networked, and is not the typical bureaucratically organized conventional military

foe. Consequently, classic raiding techniques may or may not work. Before determining this, however, one must first assemble, collate, and understand the techniques.

3. Thesis Outline and Roadmap

I first outline and examine the principles of raiding and describe how military raids are planned and executed in Chapter II. In Chapter III, I examine lessons to be learned from the strategically significant raiding campaign conducted by Plains Indians in the American Southwest and in Northern Mexico from 1800–1890. Chapter IV examines current Law Enforcement Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for conducting raids against street gangs and drug cartels in America. The aim is to understand and draw lessons from these raid methodologies as well. In the conclusion, I summarize some “best practices” lessons learned and make recommendations for current and future raids against terrorists.

4. Research Methodology and Literature Review

This thesis draws on several bodies of literature, the author’s first hand experiences participating in raids, and time spent observing the Salinas Police Department. Thus far, no one has collated “best practices” for raids across various U.S. forces and the interagency, never mind when one considers other countries’ operational experiences (e.g., Israel, the UK, etc.). The most significant limitation encountered in this research was the time available to conduct the study. Another limitation of this study is that it utilizes only unclassified documents. There may be classified TTPs and examples of innovative methods for conducting raids unavailable in the open source literature. I have therefore limited myself to a historical perspective, utilizing the Plains Indians case, as well as an alternative point of view provided by the law enforcement example.

Prior to writing this thesis, I deployed for approximately forty months in support of the GWOT with conventional and special operations units from 2001 to 2007. I have conducted operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan ranging from village assessments and community-building to high intensity raids, utilizing the most up-to-date technology and methods for finding, fixing, and finishing terrorists in unilateral Army, Joint Special Operations, as well as Coalition operations with indigenous forces. One aim of this thesis is to explore raiding techniques that may be used in specific situations to help units like the ones to which I have been assigned. The recommendations for future raiding practices contained within this document are not exhaustive or absolute in their nature. Some techniques will not work in some circumstances, and no silver bullet exists to guarantee success in the realm of tactics or strategy. My earnest desire is to expand the academic discussion on raiding, and to help enable future commanders to keep all available options on the table when determining the best course of action for their unit against a specific foe, regardless of the theater location, political situation, or enemy composition. My premise is that utilizing the appropriate raiding technique at the correct time and place under the appropriate circumstances will play a significant role in the disruption or destruction of networked terrorist organizations.

5. Significant Findings of the Study

a. On Raiding

Raids to deny terrorists sanctuary are a critical aspect of disrupting their operations worldwide. The United States should exploit successful raids in the information domain by maximizing the strategic gain won by each operation. The continued ability and national will to conduct audacious, long-range raids will be especially important as the open conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan dissipate, and the United States returns to “peacetime” political conditions.

b. Lessons from the Indian Raids

We should always look to historical cases to find ways to improve our current techniques. It may be necessary to kill a large number of one's enemy in order to defeat his will to fight. Raiding involves the extremely accurate and discriminating use of force that delegates to the commando the responsibility to make life or death decisions on a person-by-person basis at the very last second, which serves to minimize the likelihood of collateral damage. It is also important to treat civilians as well as captured enemy personnel with humanity. Taking family members captive, as the Plains Indians did so frequently, may be a logical and humane way to force terrorists to surrender (while this method may be called into question by current international laws of war). Finally, the ruthless cavalry techniques used against the Indians may be justified in some cases when it is required to kill your enemy and defeat his way of life in order to preserve your own.

c. Lessons from Law Enforcement Raids

Law enforcement raids provide an example of methods that should be considered for use in military applications against terrorists. Incorporating law enforcement investigation methods may prove beneficial to raid planners in military organizations, as could using police-style entry methods. Of particular use may be riot control devices such as tear gas to increase the probability of peacefully negotiating an end to standoffs between military forces and surrounded terrorists. Lastly, the historic and ongoing criticism of how raids are conducted on American soil and the police methods developed to allay critics' concerns should be taken into consideration by the military when it finds itself in similar situations.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Strategy

Colin S. Gray's works, *Explorations in Strategy* and *Modern Strategy*, offer very useful overviews of military strategy. In *Explorations of Strategy*, Gray addresses strategic utility of special operations, air power, and sea power in extreme detail, while he covers strategy with respect to conflict type in *Modern Strategy*. Although he does not cover raiding as a strategy in itself, he does comment directly on the role special operations play in conducting effective raids and the role that small forces can have on the outcome of entire conflicts. Also of significance is B.H. Liddell Hart's work, *Strategy*.

2. Doctrine

The most significant doctrinal publication I found with regard to raiding is the *United States Marine Corps Field Manual 7-32* entitled *Raid Operations*. This publication covers in complete detail the planning process for military raids, and it actually goes into far more detail than Army manuals that I have used for years. Significant documents that outline the United States doctrine for raids are *FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Squad and Platoon*, *FM 3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company*, and *SH 21-76 The Ranger Handbook*. Additional tactical guidance on raiding is available in *FM 7-85 Ranger Operations*. With the exception of the Ranger manuals, one cannot help but be disappointed with the lack of specific directions given for planning and conducting raids in these documents.

3. History

For an overview of raiding throughout the ages, *From Troy to Entebbe*, edited by John Arquilla provides excellent snapshots into the uses of raids during very different periods of history. Beginning with the use of the Trojan horse, the book covers raiding techniques in short articles beginning with those used

against pirates before the United States Navy existed and ending with the deceptive, modern, long range raid at Entebbe conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces to rescue fellow citizens held hostage in Uganda.

World War II commando raids are covered quite thoroughly in the form of six case studies in *Spec Ops, Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*, by William H. McRaven. The cases are representative of both the European and Pacific theaters of operation, from both the Allied and the Axis perspectives. While there is a voluminous literature about World War II raids, I felt the nature of these raids (state versus state) was not totally consistent with the nature of the adversary the United States faces today (state versus non-state actor).

Brian DeLay in *War of a Thousand Deserts* thoroughly covers the history of Indian raiding on the Southern Plains. His thesis is that Comanche raids against the northern Mexican territories from 1800 through 1840 paved the way for the United States to defeat Mexico easily when the U.S. invaded in 1847. The U.S. acquisition of northern Mexican states could even be viewed as a neighborly act that lessened the suffering of Mexicans at the hands of Apache, Comanche, Kiowa, and Navajo raiders. Because so much of the literature on the raiding culture of the Southern Plains tribes uses the same few sources, I turned to Paul I. Wellman's *The Indian Wars of the West*, which appears the most rigorous as it is based mostly on original sources and first person accounts. The initial edition was published in 1934, so it stands to reason that Wellman had access to people who participated in the Indian Wars, or at least knew of them first hand. I believe the Indian wars offer an underutilized wealth of information concerning how governments should handle outlaw groups. Additionally, if one looks at the significant problem posed by ungoverned or under-governed states as sanctuaries for terrorism, then it may be wise to uncover more lessons from Mexico's, Texas's, and the United States' struggles with the Plains Indians.

4. Law Enforcement and Gangs

Paul T. Mahoney explains law enforcement raiding doctrine in *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*. This book serves as a text for police investigators as it describes an assortment of drug related cases and scenarios. His doctrinal explanation of raids is congruent with the information I received in my interview with SWAT Commander Dino Bardoni of the Salinas, California Police Department, as well as what I learned from riding along with some of Commander Bardoni's SWAT officers on duty. Other law enforcement raiding documents include the *SWAT Operational Guidelines and Standardized Training Recommendations* published by the California Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission. One interesting critical analysis of law enforcement raiding that is referenced by most recent critics in newspapers and other periodicals is Radley Balko's monograph *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America*.

For gang-related material, I turned to some government sources as well as some published documents meant for the criminal justice community. *Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective* by Kimberly Tobin provides an overview of most gang-related topics. She covers definitions, explanations of why and how gangs develop, why people join, how they operate and, among other things, how to prevent and intervene in gang problems. In *Contemporary Gangs: An Organizational Analysis*, Deborah Lamm Weisel identifies formal organizational features and confirms my suspicion that gangs bear many similarities to terrorist groups. Although Weisel spends a lot of time trying to fit gangs into the bureaucratic organizational model, finally determining that they do not fit that organizational design, she draws the conclusion that the gangs she studied are successful, purposeful organizations that are highly adaptable and best described using Richard L. Daft's organic-adaptive classification. I believe even a modest look at the Global Salafi Jihad with regard to organizational analysis ties gangs and Al Qaida together as sharing a similar organizational structure or style.

The monograph *Urban Street Gang Enforcement* published by the Bureau of Justice Assistance provides a strategy outline for law enforcement agencies to adopt when developing their own tailored strategy to solve their local gang violence issues. This is an excellent collaborative resource for techniques and skills. *The Florida Gang Reduction Strategy 2008–2012*, produced by the Florida Attorney General's Office, is an example of one state's strategy that specifically targets gang problems through the multidisciplinary approach of Prevention/Intervention, Law Enforcement, and Rehabilitation/Re-entry. Another valuable resource for gang information is the website www.streetgangs.com.

II. FUNDAMENTALS OF RAIDING

A. DEFINITION OF RAIDING

1. What is a Raid?

Important to the complete understanding of the raiding concept is the definition of terms. Most important is the definition of a raid itself. This chapter explains the terminology and major concepts required to understand raiding in the 21st century against terrorist enemies.

The Marine Corps Field Manual on Raid Operations defines a raid as:

. . . an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.¹

Raids take many forms and have a variety of useful purposes, but the main point is that raids are small in scale, occur in enemy held territory (or at least in places where the enemy feels a certain level of comfort), and do not include the seizure and holding of land or structures for any lengthy period of time. An expanded list of reasons to engage in raids follows, as the rationales for raids have evolved over time. There are some especially unique aims in the conduct of raids against terrorist enemies.

2. Who Conducts Raids?

“Raids may be conducted by aviation, artillery, infantry, reconnaissance, combat engineers, or any other group with skills and equipment suited for the mission.”² This definition must be expanded by including missile launching

¹ Department of the Navy, *FMFM 7-32* (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1993). 1-1.

² Ibid.

assets, such as the Tomahawk Cruise Missile raids against Al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan in 1993, as well as the more popular and recent Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) raids conducted by Predators or other armed assets. Although very similar to a pinpoint strike by a single aviation asset with smart-bomb technological assistance, there are numerous advantages, as well as limitations in conducting these UAV raids, which typically utilize maximum standoff and minimum personnel at the point of attack. A key distinction between these various types of raiding forces is the capability to exploit the objective following the raid. Only soldiers on the ground can truly exploit a raided objective, and therefore conduct the most effective and useful raids against terrorist enemies. Additionally, soldiers on the ground can more judiciously control the level of violence on the target. The pros and cons of putting assault troops on raid objectives will be the subject of subsequent discussion.

B. PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING RAIDS

When to conduct raids is a complex decision that involves strategic and tactical considerations. As alluded to above, the ability of raids to achieve strategic gains utilizing small numbers of friendly forces requires uncommon planning, intelligence, and attention to detail in all facets of the operation. The purpose and overall desired end state are the most important aspects of raiding, and must be clearly identified prior to the assignment of the mission to the executing unit. “Awareness of the dual tactical-strategic dimensions of special operations allows one to see that what is necessary for success at one level may create problems at the other.”³ Assigning a purpose for a raid and then choosing an incompatible raiding force results in severely increased risk to the operation in the forms of risk to accomplishing the mission and risk to the forces involved.

³ John Arquilla. *From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996). xx.

And, in keeping with the duality of raiding a tactical success may result in strategic failure. An extensive list of modern raid purposes and the forces and techniques likely to achieve those purposes follows.

1. Purpose of the Raid—Gain Information

One of the most important and long-lasting purposes of conducting raids is simply to gain information. Although intelligence collection systems in the modern world are numerous, expensive, and relied upon daily for important strategic and tactical planning, there is no greater intelligence than that collected by trustworthy humans at the time and place of interest.

Information is the domain of strategic competition in the modern battle with terrorists. Al Qaida continually fights in the information sphere to gain an advantage over Western military and economic might, while sidestepping the diplomatic arena. Raid operations are one way to collect the ground truth on those who seek to damage our national interests through terrorism.

2. Purpose of the Raid—Destroy Enemy Personnel or Infrastructure

A simple, but effective purpose of raiding is to destroy enemy personnel and equipment deemed important to the opposition's organization. This is the purpose most lay-people think of first when raiding is mentioned. Many examples in history point to the effectiveness and perceived importance of executing this type of raid. In 1944, Hitler entrusted the success of the German main effort Panzer attack across Belgium to a glider-borne raiding force whose mission was to destroy the enemy guns at Fort Eben Emael, which over-watched the main bridge crossings over the Albert Canal. In the raid, a force of sixty-nine

German glider-men defeated a significantly larger Belgian force, destroying ten of seventeen cannon positions, and rendering the fort useless to the Belgian defenses.⁴

In today's battle against terrorists, there remains a requirement to kill enemy combatants. But more important for strategic gains is the ability of international actors to win the information campaign that closely follows and amplifies the actions taken. Killing key terrorist leaders, for instance, will ensure that those specific individuals will never again plan or conduct future operations. However, the impact of enemy propaganda regarding methods, collateral damage, violations of sovereignty, and other effects in association with the killing of key leaders may result in an overall negative gain for the raiding force. Capturing and bringing to justice terrorist perpetrators may prove far more effective in disrupting and defeating terrorist ideology, conversion, recruitment and ultimately terrorist actions, so long as the detainment, trial, and sentencing are perceived as fair and just. Justice in detention, trial, and sentencing of terrorists is the subject of much debate and not within the scope of this work, but it does impact the execution and efficacy of raid operations.

3. Purpose of the Raid—Psychological Gain

A seldom-discussed, but extremely important purpose for conducting raids is to gain a psychological advantage over the enemy.⁵ The psychological aspect of raiding occurs in two parts—first, the direct psychological effect of the raiding actions themselves, and second, the use of raiding to deceive the enemy.

⁴ William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995). 29, 55.

⁵ FMFM7-32. 1-2.

a. *Direct Psychological Gain—the Feeling of Surprise and Shock*

Raiding the enemy at a time and place when and where the enemy feels secure instills an overwhelming feeling of helplessness in those captured in the raid as well as in those who witnessed the raid. Witnessing the raid may come in the form of hearing about the captures on the news, via local rumor networks, or even by seeing the action as it unfolds.

Exploiting the shock of capture by conducting on-the-battlefield questioning of individuals on raided objectives may result in significant intelligence gains, as well as sow the seeds of distrust among the enemy. Terrorist networks operate utilizing very tight circles of trust.⁶ Leveraging the psychological impact of bringing the counter-terrorist fight close to those who are close to terrorists allows raiders to exploit friends, relatives, and neighbors to gain information about hard-core terrorists and their plans or capabilities.

The psychological impact felt locally by enemy forces and their supporters is not only felt at the point of attack. A series or campaign of raids against an enemy may have an overarching psychological effect that defeats the will of the enemy to participate in further terrorist actions due to the likelihood of being targeted, captured, killed, or having family members detained by the raiding forces. Furthermore, law-abiding citizens, aware of terrorist operations in their community, may feel comfortable informing authorities about the whereabouts of terrorists after citizens see multiple, effective, precision raids targeting terrorists in the neighborhood.

⁶ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terrorist Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 178.

b. *Deception as a Psychological Purpose of Raiding*

Deception is an active measure with the precise aim of causing one's enemy to make mistakes.⁷ Furthermore, the methods of deception fall into five categories according to Jon Latimer, three of which involve raids or raiding forces as the primary instrument for execution.

The first of the three categories consists of "displays that are deliberately intended to catch the enemy's eye." "These can be used to portray a unit that does not exist, to give the impression that there are powerful forces in an area where there are actually very few."⁸ What better way is there to show a terrorist organization that extremely capable forces are watching and able to strike in their local area than by raiding? Even if the capacity for governance and policing is small or non-existent in a specific area, well placed raids may deceive the enemy regarding the actual capability of the host nation or an interested outside power. This concept of deception used as an economy of force application may bear fruit in the denial of sanctuary to the Al Qaida core in places like the Federal Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, for instance.

The second category of deception to utilize raids is feint operations.⁹ The feint is a classic military strategic move that deceives the enemy about the particular composition, disposition, or general direction of the main attack. Applied to fighting terrorists around the world, media coverage, word of mouth reporting, and general hype that follow American raiding operations are perfect feints to distract Al Qaida and international scrutiny away from other U.S. and Coalition initiatives.

The third category of deception involves demonstrations, which are similar to feints, but different because the force conducts a demonstration on a

⁷ Jon Latimer, *Deception in War* (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2001). 1.

⁸ Ibid., 72.

⁹ Jon Latimer, *Deception in War*, 72.

front or in a location where the deceiving force has no intention of fighting.¹⁰ Again, if we use the example of Al Qaida, its core is likely residing in Pakistan; a few well-placed demonstrations well inside Pakistan's borders may signal to the AQ leadership that the United States will step up its targeting. Ideally this will flush out AQ, causing the premature evacuation of relatively secure facilities by AQ leaders in Pakistan. However, in reality, the U.S. may not intend to conduct full-scale terrorist clearance operations inside Pakistan.

4. Purpose of the Raid—Harass the Enemy

The main purpose of conducting harassment raids is to demoralize the enemy and instill a feeling of helplessness and hopelessness about defending his forces, headquarters, and logistics centers.¹¹ Harassment raids may deny the enemy sanctuary in a general location or serve to stymie the opponent by humiliating him on his own turf. Raids that unveil the enemy's inability to protect his most prized possessions, locations, or leaders will have strategic impacts on that enemy's ability to wage war.¹²

a. Harass to Deny Sanctuary

Raids conducted in neighborhoods or on houses where terrorists are known to live, where they visit, or where they have family ties denies that particular location to terrorist use. Changing the methods and timing of raids is key to harassment as a form of area denial, so that the raiding force does not telegraph patterns of conduct to the enemy, resulting in the raiding force losing its surprise and effectiveness. For instance, the raiding force may want to conduct some raids at night and some in daylight. It would be well served to conduct some raids utilizing low-violence techniques, while other targets should be assaulted using explosive entry techniques followed by controlled demolition

¹⁰ Jon Latimer, *Deception in War*, 72.

¹¹ FMFM 7-32. 1–2.

¹² Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996). 178.

of the site to accomplish other strategic or tactical objectives, such as destroying the infrastructure that serves as key terrain for the enemy. There are a multitude of methods to vary raiding techniques and some of these will be covered in subsequent sections.

In summary, persistent harassment by an “all-knowing” force, that thereby advertises its limitless resources, will significantly influence the enemy’s capability to wage offensive operations, particularly if the enemy is kept on the defensive.

b. Harass to Expose Enemy Vulnerability

Raids can also be used to expose the weakness of an adversary. Colin Gray, for instance, cites an example from the 1968–1970 war of attrition between Israel and Egypt. Israeli Defense Forces executed long-range raids inside Egypt. Most significant was a raid on the Naj Hamadi transformer station and bridge, which represented a top-of-the-line facility for Egypt at the time, and symbolized Egypt’s economic and political might. The attack on this source of pride humiliated Nasser’s government due to its military’s inability to secure such an important location 320 kilometers from the nearest border. Adding insult to injury was the fact that it took only small groups of IDF personnel to conduct the operation. A mere fistful of “inferior” soldiers operating on the ground inside Egypt humiliated the Egyptians and their government, which resulted in an eventual strategic victory for Israel; Nasser, his population, and his military realized they could not defeat the Israelis.¹³

Another example of exposing enemy vulnerability through the conduct of swift, long-range, and violent raids executed with the intent of humiliating an enemy was Al Qaida’s September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. With three successful suicide attacks (out of the four attempted), Al Qaida inflicted severe feelings of shame, guilt, and helplessness on Americans.

¹³ Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy*, 178.

In a propaganda coup, these images and feelings were broadcast and re-broadcast around the world. Al Qaida did not completely achieve its desired effects, but America was temporarily paralyzed. This temporary, but deeply emotional harassment of the United States may have served Al Qaida well with a short-term victory. However, U.S. counter-raids against AQ may yet turn out to outweigh the strategic benefits of conducting the attacks in the first place. From a strategic point of view, the raids conducted by a small force on the under-prepared and unaware United States did have devastating effects on the country as a whole, yet the raids also served as a wake-up call so that the U.S. would not be taken unawares again in the future.

5. Purpose of the Raid—Spoiling Effect

Raiding can be used preemptively. Covert raids, in particular, represent a politically sensitive offensive weapon for preventing terrorists from accomplishing their sinister plots. Commandos are very capable when armed with specific, timely, and accurate intelligence. Conducting raids to spoil enemy plans may also be the most politically useful strategy available since they obviate the need for major ground forces to occupy sovereign territory for a significant period. This limits international scrutiny, preserving both national power as well as the safety of the raiding forces themselves.

On 18 November 1976, elite Rhodesian counter-terrorist forces, the Selous Scouts, conducted a spoiling cross-border raid against the Soviet supported ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army) headquarters in Botswana. The KGB supplied ZIPRA with several suitcase bombs with which to conduct terrorist attacks in Rhodesia. But, the Selous Scouts spoiled this plan by conducting an audacious raid deep into the terrorists' sanctuary in Botswana. The Selous Scouts captured the bombs and then used several of the enemy devices to destroy the ZIPRA headquarters in Francistown.¹⁴ This is a vivid

¹⁴ Bruce Hoffman and RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA., *Commando Raids: 1946-1983*. (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 1985). 52.

example of just how much can be accomplished through a raid when raiders can combine specific intelligence with unparalleled improvisation and sophistication. Not only can they deny the enemy the ability to conduct offensive terrorist actions, but can turn the tables on them, destroying terrorist infrastructure and personnel in a single, multifaceted operation.

6. Purpose of the Raid—Recover / Rescue Personnel / Equipment

Probably the most easily justified and popular type of raid is one conducted to free persons held against their will by political, military, or, more recently, terrorist captors. Nineteen out of one hundred commando operations executed between 1946 and 1983 were rescue operations.¹⁵ Against hard-core terrorist enemies like Al Qaida, rescue operations must be conducted extremely quickly. Terrorists are unlike most hostage takers in that they are more ruthless and willing to conduct heinous acts like beheadings and other mutilations. In most other cases, hostage takers do not want to draw attention or earn the ill-will of the world. Instead they seek a ransom or that a series of relatively rational demands be met. In many cases, terrorists brutally murder hostages before they can be located with a degree of certainty necessary for successful rescue operations. Rescues are complex raids that require extreme intelligence, competence, control, daring, and capability for success.

C. PRINCIPLES OF RAIDING

1. McCraven's Theory of Special Operations

In his book *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*, William McRaven identifies six principles of special operations: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose.

¹⁵ Bruce Hoffman and RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA., *Commando Raids: 1946–1983*, 19.

McRaven derived his theory from case studies comprised of raids. Given this, it seems safe to assume that these six principles are critical to any raid or raiding campaign, and to operations conducted against terrorists in particular.

2. Hoffman's Effectiveness of Commando Raids

Bruce Hoffman, in a Rand study published in 1985, analyzes 100 cases of which he labels "commando raids" to determine the effectiveness of "clandestine military operations staged by small-size raiding parties during ostensibly peacetime situations, and their potential utility as a component of U.S. military policy for responding to terrorist attacks."¹⁶ Hoffman considers the following six factors significant in determining the success or failure of any given raid: "the geographical distance between the raiding party's staging area and its objective, the previous training of the raiders, the size of the raiding party, the method of transportation used, the objective of the raid, and the use of disguise and deception."¹⁷ Boiling down these factors we get: geographical location, training, size of force, transportation method, purpose, and surprise.

McRaven's six principles and Hoffman's six factors overlap to a significant degree. As mentioned in most work regarding raids and raiding, achieving surprise is critically important, be it tactical, strategic or even doctrinal surprise. Hoffman's explanation of the purpose for deception and disguise is to achieve surprise. In fact, his highlighting the importance of choosing appropriate methods of transportation has to do with increasing probabilities that the raiding force achieves surprise at the raid location. Similarly, he concludes that limiting raiding forces to between 15 and 50 members will enhance their ability to achieve surprise while still remaining a formidable fighting force. When Hoffman emphasizes training and McRaven draws attention to the importance of repetition what they are underscoring is exactly what special operations forces try to

¹⁶ Bruce Hoffman and RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA., *Commando Raids: 1946–1983*, 1.

¹⁷ Ibid.

achieve: the ability to execute previously rehearsed mission profiles on a constrained planning timeline in the name of surprise. The concept of having a well-trained, proficient, and rehearsed force is especially important to raiding forces, as both point out. Again too, Hoffman's concept of geographic proximity relates back to surprise, as does McRaven's treatment of good intelligence, since a solid intelligence estimate of any situation will feature the terrain and routes that will best support the attacking unit's achievement of surprise.

Surprise is critical in raiding against terrorist enemies because of the special character of this enemy. Terrorists are not simply adversaries who desire to pursue the extension of politics through violence between national armies. Terrorists inflict serious harm on innocent people in an attempt to swiftly manipulate sovereign governments. Surprising terrorists with raids in their "sanctuaries" is one way to pre-empt terrorist plots and is critical to preventing them from developing fully developed campaigns of mass destruction.

Hoffman's principles are useful for objectively determining the probability of raid success based on a few distinct measurable variables. McRaven's principles are important for ensuring the relative superiority of special operations necessary to achieve success. But, I believe a new principle of raiding is required when conducting a campaign of raids against terrorist enemies in the future: perception, as in how the raid is perceived.

3. Principles of Raiding against Terrorist Enemies

Taking into account the principles analyzed above, the common list that must go forward, in order of importance includes:

1. Training
2. Purpose
3. Surprise
4. Speed
5. Security
6. Simplicity

For raiding in the 21st century, we must also add perception. Perception may be thought of in four ways.

Perception is by definition the act of gaining insight, intuition, or knowledge, marked by discernment and understanding.¹⁸ Incidentally, this word is derived from the Latin *per* and *capere*, or “to seize,” so I believe it has particular relevance in the context of raiding principles and is deeply rooted in a concept of winning the information campaign. As B. H. Liddell Hart so eloquently states, “A good cause is a sword as well as armour. Likewise, chivalry in war can be a most effective weapon in weakening the opponent’s will to resist, as well as augmenting moral strength.”¹⁹ How raids are perceived allows grand strategy to succeed so long as a force conducts raids for just purposes in an ethical manner and so long as the aftermath of operations are handled justly in the eyes of the watching public. Raids hold meaning for four sets of people. There is the psychological message sent to or received enemy, friendly, and neutral witnesses; second are local perceptions about the justice of the raid in

¹⁸ *The American Heritage College Dictionary*, ed. Costello, Robert B. et al., Third ed. (Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993). 1013–1014.

¹⁹ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1967). 336.

terms of its purpose, the raiders conduct, and the raid's outcomes. Third are perceptions at the national level. Fourth are perceptions in the international arena.

The psychological message sent to or received by the enemy, friendly, and neutral witnesses is a lesser-included purpose of every raid conducted for any of the major purposes outlined above. No matter whether the raid is to destroy a ball-bearing factory or to rescue hostages held for months, one key aspect of raiding is the psychological impact of an outside force imposing its will upon an adversary. The psychological message is likely felt most intensely by individuals who actually experience the raid first-hand; however, larger audiences may be influenced in their future endeavors through their knowledge of the raiding force's previous and potential actions. The advent of communications technology amplifies this final point as first-hand verbal, pictorial, and video accounts are shared rapidly.

A small number of individuals develop and decide local perceptions about the justice of the raid in terms of its purpose, the raiders conduct, and the raid's outcomes. Personnel on or near the raid objective develop their understanding very quickly through observation and participation in the raid event. Nosy neighbors stick their heads out of windows to observe the raiding force approach the objective, or concerned local leaders arrive at the raid scene to offer support or explanation for the people or items found on the objective. These first-hand witnesses spread their impression of the raid and the raiding force's conduct to everyone they encounter. This process of observation and reporting shapes rumors that develop about the raid.

U.S. domestic attitudes about the raid develop more slowly, but can have a significant impact on whether it is considered a success or failure, with repercussions on subsequent raids. The facets at the national level are similar to those of the local level. However, in contrast to local reactions, the nation's response / attitude to the raid or a series of raids may ebb and flow over a larger period of time. Emotions at the national level can spike at different times rather

than run as high as they might close to the actual raided objective. National attitudes about raiding may have such long term and far-reaching consequences as to influence national elections or affect support for military forces and governments in general. For example, the perception of mistreatment of terrorist detainees in suspected secret prisons caused a national uproar in the United States that left many citizens feeling uneasy about their government and its prosecution of a struggle many want to believe is just.

The last point has to do with international perceptions. Countries, populations, governments, and individuals will draw their own conclusions about raiding campaigns, raiding behavior, and raiding methodologies. The conclusions drawn about the long-term outcome of raids against a specific enemy will cause people to take action for or against the raiding force. That ultimately, is what decides the success or failure of the raid. Finally, international judgements may represent the composite understanding of people in communities that are not necessarily bounded by geography—such as Arabs, Muslims, Jews or some other “networked” population.

D. DEFINITIONS, BENEFITS, AND CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESSFUL AND FAILED RAIDING

The literature does not generally define specific criteria for judging the success of a campaign conducted through raids or for judging particular raids against an objective set of criteria. Raids are deemed successful in most cases if the operation achieves the mission assigned (or as conducted by the unit commander) while the raiding unit sustains minimal damage or casualties. In many cases, raiding campaigns are considered successful depending on the number and type of enemy combatants versus the number and type of friendly forces killed or captured. Unfortunately, these criteria reflect flawed thinking for raiding in the 21st century. In the 21st century one must always be aware of grand strategy and consider perception about the raid or raiding campaign prior to judging it a success or failure.

Rather than operational success or failure, it is critical to evaluate gains or losses in the strategic realm. For example, the botched attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran was considered a major failure for Special Operations Forces and for this type of long range, cross border, international raid. However, Bruce Hoffman refers repeatedly to Winston Churchill's insistence that commando operations needed to be conducted during World War II in order to gain a psychological advantage with the English population. Perhaps viewed from a different perspective the tactical failure at Desert One may have nonetheless accomplished several things. First, Operation Eagle Claw provided hope to the American hostages in Iran that their country had not abandoned them. Second, it boosted public awareness about the efforts that the Carter Administration was undertaking to free the hostages. Third, it announced to the world that the United States possessed the power, will, and technical expertise to secretly mount such a complex operation.²⁰

On the other side of the coin here is the successful bombing raid supported by special operations reconnaissance teams, which killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaida in Iraq. By all accounts, this was a successfully conducted raid that accomplished a long-standing American strategic goal—kill the terrorist leader in Iraq who was behind most of the heinous violence in the country. Yet, as John Robb reports, another leader quickly replaced Zarqawi and most other authors have agreed that this single raid against the AQI leader did not defeat the insurgency in Iraq.²¹ So, even though many in the West viewed the raid positively because the media had long portrayed Zarqawi as such an important figure for the enemy, yet, others have questioned the raid's outcome since the enemy simply morphed and did not wither away. But looking at it strategically, perhaps the raid did achieve a

²⁰ David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 96–99.

²¹ John Robb, *Brave New War : The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2007). 113. Also see *The Gamble* by Thomas Ricks for an analysis of the insurgency in Iraq from 2006–2008 and the United States strategy for defeating it.

positive outcome for the U.S. and the Iraqi Governments by forcing AQI to accept a sub-par leader whose fear of discovery by American raiders pushed him further into the underworld. By reducing leadership effectiveness overall, the raid may have inflicted lasting damage on the organization as a whole.

E. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF RAIDS

Warfare in general contains many grey areas that make it difficult to judge whether any one act or operation is a total success or a total failure. War is expensive on all levels; people die, populations are displaced, and infrastructure is destroyed. Raiding, however, is quite different from major conventional combat operations that pollute the modern vision of warfare. In the Global War on Terrorism, armies do not establish front lines and rear areas. No longer do carpet bombing campaigns target factories producing the enemy's war machines. Through raiding, forces seek to operate with surgical precision in conditions that demand nothing less. Because adversaries remain intent on causing harm and have to be destroyed one has to wonder how else can we do this except through raiding? Given the types of urban environments where most terrorist groups now operate, and the complexity of terrain and collusion of enemy and non-combatant populations, raids are the most tightly focused and least physically destructive operations possible. Raids enable commanders to utilize non-lethal or less-than-lethal techniques in order to reduce injury to non-combatants. The "in and out" nature of raids also match the limited nature of force friendly forces can effectively bring to bear on the enemy.²²

The unintended consequences of raids again reside in the realm of perceptions. Today's technologically advanced raiding force utilizes every asset available to minimize collateral damage while pursuing its objectives. In many cases, raid objectives are seized and cleared without the firing of a single shot, and in some cases they are conducted at the invitation of local residents. There

²² Department of the Army, *FM3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006). 12-2, 12-3.

are a variety of techniques available to today's raider to tailor the amount of force to be applied at the specific objective, on a house-by-house or site-by-site basis. Raiding puts the most capable decision making apparatus (a well-trained, ethically minded, and mature human being) at the extreme point of decision-making in order to apply the appropriate force at the appropriate time and place. No computer targeting device, analyst software, or decision-making process can match the speed, accuracy, or precision of the special operator's brain.

The unintended consequences of raiding can be significant, but the most important are death or injury of non-combatants and un-intended destruction of residential or community property. These unintended consequences provide a sharp adversary with ample ammunition to mount an information campaign against the raiding foe. Consequently, the raiding force must do everything possible to satisfy three criteria while planning and conducting raid operations in order to win the battle of perception regarding unintended consequences. First, the cause must be just—as mentioned earlier, justice in the reasons for war are the frontline defense against criticisms against the fighting. Second, the conduct of the raid must be just. Applying the minimum amount of force required to accomplish the mission will ensure this criterion is met. Lastly, the treatment of personnel—combatants and non-combatants alike—must be just from the point of capture *through* the detention process and, when applicable, through the trial and sentencing of terrorists. Not all people will view these three criteria in the same way. Nor will less lethal force always succeed in accomplishing the aims of the raid. In reality, the raiding force may well need to kill all or just certain people on an objective in order to accomplish its mission, but the degree to which the raiders apply violence with precision will redeem raiding as a humane, discretionary, highly specific, and effective application of violence when and where required.

III. NATIVE AMERICAN INDIAN RAIDING

A. THE RAIDERS AND THE RAIDED FROM 1820–1900

1. Development of Native American Raiders and Warrior Society

Native American Indian interactions with citizens and armies on the American Plains and Southwest offer significant lessons regarding warfare, and raiding especially. Entire populations of Comanche, Navajo, Kiowa, Apache, Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho and others formed their lives around a warrior code. After the release of Spanish horses onto the plains around 1700, these native tribes in America developed unmatched fighting and equestrian skills to emerge as superior nomadic warrior societies that preyed on the sedentary farming and ranching people of the surrounding areas through raiding.²³ The Indians of the plains made their living from hunting, herding, roaming over large land areas, and raiding their neighbors.

The grasslands of the prairie and the deserts of the southwest were largely unfit for permanent settlements, but the Indians thrived by living a nomadic hunting lifestyle following the enormous buffalo herds. Indians met their needs through the complete utilization of the killed animals. Meat, hides, fur, bones, and organs—nearly every piece of the buffalo had a purpose for the Indian people of the plains.²⁴ Soon, however, Indians discovered that they could live a more fulfilled lifestyle by raiding and stealing the immense horse-wealth and other possessions belonging to their neighbors to the south.

Navajo Indians in present day Mexico were the first to secure horses from Spanish settlers after the Great Pueblo Revolt of 1690 that caused the Spanish

²³ *The Great Indian Wars 1540–1890*, DVD, directed by Ron Meyer BCI, A Navarre Corporation Company, 2005) Disk 1.

²⁴ Ibid.

to abandon their herds.²⁵ Navajos utilized these horses to develop mobile attack parties with which they plundered additional horses and goods from Spanish settlements. The Navajos then tended their own herds and became expert horse breeders over time.²⁶

From birth, boys learned and women reinforced the warrior culture. Women handcrafted amulets while pregnant for their boys to wear for protection as young men and warriors. Boys developed warrior skills by playing games involving weapons and engaging in friendly competitions that simulated hand to hand fighting. Indian youth ran and swam to develop unmatched strength and endurance. Shooting both native weapons and newly acquired rifles for skill and survival rounded out the boys' education as future warriors. The conglomeration of special skills and ferocity developed by living a nomadic hunting lifestyle served Indians well in warfare as the many tribes on the Plains frequently fought wars between themselves. Boys became warriors around age 14, and began leading their own raiding parties as early as age 17.²⁷

Warrior societies actually made a sort of game out of plains warfare. The name of the game was "counting coup" and the outcome of scoring points was prestige, honor, and leadership. One counted coup through acts of bravery against an enemy. The most exhilarating and highly regarded action was to actually move in and touch a living, fighting enemy with one's own hands. Other ways to count coup were by scalping or otherwise retrieving proof of enemies killed at longer range. Indian warriors become respected chiefs and actually led men on the warpath through their continued prowess of counting coup and by

²⁵ Meyer, *The Great Indian Wars 1540–1890*, Disk 1.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Paul I. Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), 484. 10–11.

success on raids. Indian society built a quite effective method to ensure that leaders were skilled, capable, and competent, with an Indian chief's power base built on his success in battle.²⁸

Comanche women—to cite just one example—policed the warrior society through either the adoration or disdain they directed at warrior men after they returned from the warpath. Young women were reminded to “satisfy all the desires of those who distinguish themselves in battle, and not to forget to heap scorn and opprobrium on those who show cowardice.”²⁹ Additionally, the young women conducted celebratory dancing and chanting when they received news of their warriors' success. Kiowa women added stripes or other adornments to their leggings representing the number of scalps or coups won by relatives to display pride in their warrior's achievements. The women, and even the children, chastised those who performed poorly in battle or showed cowardice in the face of the enemy. Men whose cowardly acts or poor fighting skills resulted in the death of honored warriors had their belongings broken and burned while the children hurled insults and taunts.³⁰ In this effective application of social pressure, only the most tactically savvy and skilled fighters received the honor, adoration, and social approval required to advance in military rank to lead expeditions that put Indian men in harm's way.

Indian fighters used small unit tactics to achieve overwhelming success. Raids and ambushes were their operations of choice. In a classic ambush tactic, the Sioux and Cheyenne totally annihilated a cavalry troop of 81 men in a battle known as the Fetterman Massacre on December 21, 1866, near Fort Phil Kearny in present day Wyoming. A small band of ten hand-picked braves taunted the cavalry troop under Captain Fetterman's command into pursuing them over Lodge Trail Ridge and down the other side. A large Indian force awaited the

²⁸ Meyer, *The Great Indian Wars 1540–1890* Disk 2.

²⁹ Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.—Mexican War* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2008). 122.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 121–122

eager cavalry soldiers and commenced to destroy them to the last man with mostly bows, arrows, lances, and clubs.³¹ Such one sided ambushes appear repeatedly in the literature on Indian wars in America.

Raiding occurred throughout the 1800s as a method for extracting wealth from those who held it, as well as to exact revenge on enemies. Usually consisting of a small band of from four to forty Indians, raiding parties were led by the “pipeholder” who was expected to know the routes, landmarks, and target locations. Using scouts to ride ahead of the main body of attackers, Indians traveled quickly and quietly to raid objectives. Approaching as a unit, but fighting for individual honor, raiders unleashed their fury on wagon trains, farmsteads, ranches, warehouses, and sometimes even entire towns if the conditions were favorable for success.³²

After we discuss the targets of the Indian raiders, we will dive more deeply into the conduct of Indian raids and their outcomes. This next section draws on a limited number of sources with the intent of presenting the full range of methods rather than an overview of Indian warfare on the Plains per se.

2. The Enemies of Indian Raiders

a. *United States Government and Civilians*

United States citizens and armies were significant targets of Indian raiding from the 1860s through 1900. Reasons were threefold. First, the United States Government instituted a policy of ruthless brutality against the tribes of the Great Plains. This constituted an ideological attack on the very existence of the Indians as people. The orders of the cavalry under General Carleton in 1863 read as follows, “The men are to be slain whenever and wherever they can be found. The women and children may be taken prisoners, but, of course, they are

³¹ George Bird Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes* (New York, 1915; Norman, 1956: Charles Scribner's Sons: University of Oklahoma Press, 1915: 1956). 230–235.

³² Meyer, *The Great Indian Wars 1540–1890* Disk 2.

not to be killed.”³³ Second, the government’s total war philosophy executed by Civil War veteran commanders invited Indian revenge, especially after hundreds of Cheyenne women and children were slain, scalped, and mutilated by cavalry troops at Sand Creek, Colorado in 1864.³⁴ Or, for example, there was the specific targeting of Custer by the Kiowas, Arapahoes, Comanches, Apaches, and Cheyenne, because of the Washita River massacre in which Custer’s 7th Cavalry killed over 150 men, women, and children in an encampment that belonged to Chief Black Kettle, who was talking peace at Fort Cobb.³⁵ Third, the government betrayed Indian leaders through its inability to follow through with treaties. Substandard living conditions, lack of food, and denial of hunting grounds while Indians were confined to reservations set many on the warpath even after they had been “pacified.” The United States government’s continual disruption of the Indian’s lifestyle through relocation, manipulation of resources, and degradation caused warrior leaders, such as Cochise, to depart the reservation to lead life in the “wild,” raiding, looting, and killing as they saw fit to provide for their people.³⁶

American citizens became targets for Indian raids as they made themselves available to Indians in the area. Unsuspecting civilians were especially vulnerable after 1850 when the western gold rush brought thousands of pioneers through the plains on their way to California. Additionally, as Americans moved into Texas to settle, Indians noted the increasing stock-wealth of the territory and launched raids to steal that wealth from the widely dispersed and lightly defended Texans. The more settlers that moved into Indian Territory made for easier and more frequent raiding targets for Indians looking for increased wealth, or for revenge for deaths of Indian warriors in previous raids.³⁷

³³ Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*. 309.

³⁴ Ibid., 72.

³⁵ Ibid., 90, 148.

³⁶ Ibid., 345.

³⁷ Meyer, *The Great Indian Wars 1540–1890* Disk 3.

b. Mexican Landscape, Government and Civilians

Meanwhile, raids were not just launched against Americans. The Mexican government was plagued with so many changes in power and such poor security strategies during the 1800s that Indian raiders found themselves able to take advantage of northern Mexico as a fertile raiding ground. Depending on who held power, the central government focused on defending against “organized” external threats from the United States, France, or Texas (where Santa Anna lost personal honor because of his defeat there in 1836).³⁸ Under Santa Anna, Mexico became obsessed with regaining control over the wayward state of Texas, to the detriment of the other northern Mexican states, such as Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Sonora, which became easy targets for Indian raiders.³⁹ Other leaders like Anastacio Bustamante refused to consider Indians an external security threat, and therefore left the northern Mexicans to deal with the raiders on their own with limited financial and military support from the central government.⁴⁰

Defunct security arrangements in northern Mexico allowed Indian raiders to exploit the citizens in this area for most of the century. Mexican ranches and families in Northern Mexico were vulnerable to attacks given the vast amount of land needed to support large herds of horses, cattle, and sheep on the dusty desert. Widely dispersed and therefore isolated family ranches were difficult to defend against stealthy, highly skilled, and ferocious raiders.⁴¹

Knowledge and use of the Mexican desert terrain gave raiders an advantage over their sedentary victims. Prior to the 1800s, the Lipan band of the Apache Indians mingled freely for generations with the population in the northern Mexican states. The Lipan bands traded, herded, and worked among the settlers

³⁸ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War*. 72.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 192–193.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 172–173, 215.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

in Mexican territory for years. Comanche raiding parties sought after and used Lipan Apaches as guides and scouts to great advantage. Lipan Apaches assisted Comanche raiders by providing much needed intelligence on the terrain, especially regarding routes and watering holes, as well as targets in the form of settlements, ranches, and warehouses, where plentiful plunder awaited.⁴² One key piece of terrain was the Bolson de Mapimi, a large lagoon-type area broken by scattered mountains and canyons with seasonal rivers flowing through it in north central Mexico. Apache warriors knew this area well, but it was the Comanches who used it most extensively as a semi-permanent staging base from which to launch raids further south, deeper into Mexico. Mexican authorities could not pursue raiders into this difficult terrain due to their insufficient knowledge of the area, and their over-burdened methods of travel. This ungoverned sanctuary enabled the bold raiders from hundreds of miles north to re-group, organize and relax in between raiding attacks on nearby settlements.⁴³

Mexican countermeasures to Indian raids were an astounding failure. Early attempts to pacify the Indians came through government support programs, whereby Indians received a ration of blankets, corn, salt, cigarettes, and beef throughout the year to support their families as the warriors hunted animals to complete their subsistence. This method proved to be costly and, in effect, demoralized settlers who saw their entire tax revenue paid out to freeloading nomads. In 1831, the state governments of Sonora and Chihuahua were determined to force the Indians to earn their own livelihood and ceased distribution of the subsidies. That same year, the number and extent of raids increased significantly, initiating a chaotic period of raiding and stealing between Mexicans and Indians in the northern territories.⁴⁴

⁴² DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War*, 53-54.

⁴³ Ibid. 127–128.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 143–145.

Mexicans developed a marginally more effective counter-raiding strategy after citizens pleaded with their local leaders for help. The governors of the northern states requested help from the central government in the form of standing armies and outposts, but those efforts proved futile in Mexico where tax revenues could not support such costly methods. Governors then decided to take the fight to “los barbaros,” themselves. The Governors of Chihuahua and Sonora armed their citizens, rallied their communities to band together against the nomads through a media-based, newspaper propaganda campaign, and continued to spend money to encourage citizens to support their local economies. The economic dimension of this approach was designed to prevent a massive relocation of the Mexican population that would further isolate those who remained in the districts and would relegate them to becoming even easier targets for future Indian raids.⁴⁵

After four years of increasing brutality and violence in the northern states resulted in negative population growth and a continuing decline in economic productivity, the Governors invited in scalp hunters. Contrary to the Mexican government’s policy that everyone who lived in Mexico was by definition a Mexican national, northern governors, who were most affected by violent Indian raids from 1831–1835, enlisted the help of professional scalp hunters to eliminate their Indian problem. “A Chihuahuan plan promised one hundred pesos for the scalp of an Apache man, fifty for the scalp of a woman, and twenty-five for captured Apache children eleven years old and younger (apparently twelve-year-olds were fit for scalping).”⁴⁶ Scalp hunting was unpopular and not funded directly by the national government, but continued through the 1840s.

Only when raiders affected the rich southern states of Durango, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosi did Mexico consider Indian raiders a national security problem. Then Mexico City dispatched army units and housed them in

⁴⁵ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.—Mexican War*, 145-147.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 159.

garrisons called presidios spread out along the borders of Mexico to attempt to intercept the long-range raiders as they entered and exited the deeper provinces on month-long raiding expeditions.⁴⁷ Mexican generals found their foe nearly impossible to catch. By covering 100 to 125 miles per day, raiders outpaced the Mexican horse-borne army units two to one. Weak horses, mules, and encumbering supply lines also hamstrung the Mexican units. Eventually if Mexican units did catch up with or block raiders on their way out of Mexico, the damage in looting, killing, and the running off of livestock had already occurred, so the military effort in general was usually too little and too late to be effective.⁴⁸

By the late 1840s, Mexicans realized “The purely defensive war . . . is one that we have lost.”⁴⁹ The next strategy attempted by Mexico to defeat the raiders was to go on the offensive to “Pursue them [Indians] as they pursue us. Threaten them as they threaten us. Rob them as they rob us. Capture them as they capture us. Frighten them as they frighten us. Alarm them as they alarm us.”⁵⁰ However, raising appropriately skilled, outfitted, and dedicated troops to conduct this kind of campaign proved impossible for the poor frontier territories, and offensive attacks that were successful in killing Indians only served to invite further vengeance from the survivors. Consequently, under-funded forays into Apacheria and Comancheria, which resulted in the killing and butchering of Indian women and children, as well as the destruction of the vengeful warriors’ villages, did not yield significant gains.

What Mexican states needed to do was to join forces. However, they could not solidify their common interests given the national view that the Indians were actually Mexicans by birthright, and did not pose an external threat to national security. In contrast, Americans and Texans proved able to overcome

⁴⁷ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War*, 183.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 186.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

minor differences in other matters to join together and fight Indians in good faith. Indians in America were denied status as citizens. Racist Indian hating stoked by numerous tales of outrageous violence, massacres, and treachery helped Americans and Texans do what Mexicans could not. Attempts to assemble Mexican ranchers and farmers against raiding “barbarians, savages, and caribes” did not significantly galvanize Mexicans.⁵¹

B. ULTRA VIOLENT RAIDING

1. The Purposes of Indian Raids

There were two main purposes for raids conducted by Indians. Seeking plunder for economic gain was both a group and individual aim. Seeking vengeance in the form of death and damage to an adversary who had killed Indians in previous engagements was the main social justification for launching raiding parties, as well as a powerful political concept used by bands to mobilize others to join them on the warpath.⁵²

a. Economic Gains

In theory, raiding for plunder, animals, and human captives was a purely economic endeavor for small parties of skilled warriors. This type of raid was not well documented during this period of history. Consequently, it is quite possible that many or most Indian raids in Mexico prior to 1830 were less violent than later raids.⁵³ Typically, five or ten braves would cross the Rio Grande, drive off some livestock, loot a barn or hacienda, and then scoot back across the river

⁵¹ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War*, 205.

⁵² Ibid. 123.

⁵³ Ibid. 12, 123. Raids in Mexico may have been less violent in the 1830s than they were in the later 1860s–1890s except for specific time periods where Indians viciously attacked Spaniards and Mexicans in the 1810s and before that in the 1770s.

to relative safety. Horses and captives were considered wealth among the Indians.⁵⁴ As an Indian's wealth increased, so did his ability to bestow gifts upon other Indians and, accordingly, his social status in the band increased as well.⁵⁵

b. Honor and Vengeance

As noted earlier, the maintenance of honor and justice within social circles required Indian bands and chiefs to provide a moral justification for launching violent raids against a group of people. In most cases, revenge or war parties could be justified to avenge particular warriors' deaths or to claim a specific enemy's scalp for the limited purpose of avenging a prior loss. However, once the limited goals of revenge against that particular enemy were satisfied, the war party terminated its actions. Additionally it was always in good taste to join a neighboring Indian band on the warpath, not for economic gain, but for the communal purpose of seeking justice for others' losses. The associated economic gains of raiding for vengeance were a convenient direct benefit for the individual warriors and indirectly supported the band that sent its warriors to fight.⁵⁶

The 1830s and 1840s saw both these reasons for raiding merge into a revolving door of violence against Mexicans. Combining vengeance with the possibility of gaining large amounts of stock-wealth in the form of horses, cattle, and sheep, as well as pillaging the highly sought after textile goods that Mexican farms provided, Indians found just cause to form the relatively larger bands of warriors required to travel with confidence through the northern Mexican territories. These bands, fueled by vengeance and eager for plunder, were all

⁵⁴ Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 289.

⁵⁵ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War*, 91.

but unstoppable in Mexico from 1830–1848. Comanche, Navaho, Kiowa, and Apache raiders killed over 2,500 civilians and captured over 800 in northern Mexico during this period.⁵⁷

By making peace with adjacent tribes and governments in Texas, New Mexico, and other American territories, Comanche Indians were able to direct their raiding parties solely against the Mexicans who rarely ventured north of the Rio Grande, and did not think to threaten the warriors' home villages in order to defeat the raiding strategy employed by the Indians. Some Mexican entrepreneurs actually rode along on Indian raids as guides. These outlaws guided the Indians in order to deflect them away from their own settlements, share in the spoils, or simply because the Indians coerced them by using force to include torture.⁵⁸ Without this kind of support, the Indian raids in Mexico would not have been so efficient.

2. The Purposes of Government Counter-Raids

There were two primary purposes for counter-raids conducted by governments in Mexico and the United States against Indians: to punish the Indians for not behaving as authorities had prescribed, and/or to kill them in order to break their will and claim their land.⁵⁹ Punishing the Indians for attacking settlers or Plains forts was not only unsuccessful but, worse, often caused the Indians to attack again in order to seek revenge for losses suffered from the government's punitive actions. Killing Indians in sufficient numbers and with increasing brutality after the Civil War did eventually break the will of most nomadic tribes, and caused them to move to reservations and live under United States protection and rules.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War*, 123–124.

⁵⁷ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War*, 123, 319.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 111.

⁵⁹ Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 167.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 308, 315.

As Indians adjusted to life on reservations, various shortcomings on reservations caused some small bands to leave the reservations and continue living the nomadic warrior lifestyle. Unfair rules, restrictions and ineffective protection of the Indian reservations against encroachment by outside forces caused many Indians to resent these living arrangements. Especially successful raiders who either resisted going to (or left) reservations in the late 1800s and conducted violent and effective raiding campaigns through Kansas, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and Old Mexico include the famous Sioux leaders Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, and Apache leaders Cochise, Victorio, Mangus Colorado and Geronimo.⁶¹ These Indians, labeled as irreconcilables, rose to greatness in part due to the counter-raiding and extermination tactics of the 1860s, conducted by the United States Army led by General William Tecumseh Sherman.

a. Ruthless Cavalry Tactics Force Surrender of Cheyenne

While pursuing the Sioux tribes in the Dakotas and Montana in the late 1860s and 1870s, the United States cavalry pursued total war against the Indians in an effort to break their will to fight. In November 1864, Colonel J.M. Chivington, previously a Methodist preacher, took his 2nd Colorado Cavalry into Sioux country and tracked one band of Cheyenne led by Chief Black Kettle. Black Kettle was at peace with the whites. He even raised an American flag over his teepee with a white flag above it to signal to the unit his peaceful intentions. Nonetheless, the cavalry sneaked into the area during the night, reached the unsuspecting village in the early morning, and attacked as day broke, killing women and children indiscriminately until the entire village was destroyed. "The troops were disorganized. Some lined up and shot at the Indians. The rest scattered widely. Some looted the lodges; others killed stragglers; still others with ferocity never surpassed by the Indians themselves, scalped and mutilated

⁶¹ Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 308–315.

the dead.”⁶² Chivington even killed the Indian guide who led the cavalry to the village. This example is representative of the tactics used by the cavalry when they stumbled upon the scattered settlements of Plains Indians.

After similar engagements by the cavalry against the other Cheyenne Indian villages, many of the Cheyenne were forced to evacuate the sanctuary of the Powder River Valley without sufficient supplies in the dead of winter in 1876. In the freezing cold, the Cheyenne fled over cliffs in the Black Hills to escape the cavalry’s hot pursuit. However, the terrible December cold was more than the unprepared Indians could stand, and many soon surrendered after a week of constant harassment by the raiding cavalry.⁶³

This successful United States counter-raiding strategy unfolded in a progression of raiding and relentless pursuit. First, the army penetrated and took over Indian lands that provided sanctuary. Next, highly mobile cavalry units chased the Indians out of potential new sanctuary locations and kept the Indians on the run so that they could not attain the basic human needs of food, clothing, and shelter. Through constant skirmishing, the Indian warriors and their families were successfully attrited and forced to surrender.

C. RAIDING AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL TOOL

Throughout the period of the Plains Indian Wars, raids were clearly used as a psychological tool. Governments and Indians alike used violence to rally their own people against the opposing side, but also utilized raids to defeat the will of the enemy to fight. The following incidents typify raiding and violence on the Plains and in the desert southwest between Indians, Mexicans, and Americans.

⁶² Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 70–73.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 157–160.

1. Indian Raids and the Impact on Citizens

The Mimbrenño Apaches, led by Mangus Colorado settled in present day New Mexico in the 1700s after a long migration across the North American plains. In the 1850s, this band was pushed around its native area by incoming whites chasing fortunes in mining. Mangus Colorado tried to work around the invaders peaceably, but after a horrible massacre staged by white trapper James Johnson in conjunction with Mexican miners, which killed over 400 men, women, and children near the Santa Rita mining community, Mangus Colorado went on the warpath. He and a small band of his Mimbrenño warriors conducted a war of vengeance against the Santa Rita people resulting in the literal destruction of the city through carefully reconnoitered and executed raids. Authorities say that only six to ten non-Indians ever eventually escaped from Santa Rita.⁶⁴

2. Indians Ambush and Kill Cavalry “to a man”

Chief Victorio of the Mimbrenño Apaches waged raids designed to psychologically defeat his enemy. In what Paul Wellman terms “the Double Massacre,” Victorio twice ambushed and annihilated Mexican forces at the same location leaving only the dead bodies to tell the tale of what occurred. In 1879, Victorio escaped from the Fort Stanton, New Mexico reservation after learning that the government desired to relocate the tribe to San Carlos, Arizona. Victorio raided his way through New Mexico and terrorized northern Mexicans, living off the plunder with a band of about one hundred warriors. As the Mexican cavalry pursued him for weeks, Victorio laid a trap for an over-aggressive group of about fifteen scouts travelling near the Candelaria peaks. Victorio’s sharpshooters initiated fire from one side of the valley, while warriors waited opposite them in the very terrain the adversary would use to take cover from the initial rifle fire. Once the cavalry moved into the covered area, the second group of warriors swooped down upon the unsuspecting Mexicans and slaughtered them all. After

⁶⁴ Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 250–260.

the first scouting party failed to return, the military commander sent another party to investigate. Utilizing the dead bodies of the first troop as bait, Victorio laid in wait for the trailing party to congregate around the dead Mexicans in the valley before he again unleashed the Apache warriors. The second attack was a near replica of the first, although it was likely shorter in duration due to the distraction of the cavalry by their slain comrades.⁶⁵ In two engagements, Victorio thus announced and re-enforced his psychological message to Mexican and American authorities to not pursue or take lightly the power of his band, lest they experience the full brunt of his capable and determined Apache warriors.

Chief Joseph, too, conducted a textbook raid against a cavalry troop of thirty-six men in the Salmon River Valley in present day Oregon and Idaho, after he was forced into war in the wake of a series of atrocities committed by a small band of his warriors in revenge for an Indian killed unjustly by a white man. Knowing the cavalry's routes into and out of the local valleys, Joseph positioned his warriors along the high ground on both sides of White Bird Canyon. As the troop entered the canyon, Chief Joseph launched a series of attacks both from a standoff position with his riflemen as well as by a furious horseback charge to destroy the troop "to a man."⁶⁶ Joseph's first engagement with the Americans sent a remarkable message to the remaining cavalry in the area that the Nez Percé would spare no mercy on those who pursued them.

3. Indians Take Women and Children as Plunder

Indian raids in Mexico "consigned hundreds of Spanish women and children to bondage in native camps."⁶⁷ In September 1843, a Comanche raiding party attacked a ranch in the northern Mexican territory of Durango. The Comanches wounded a man tending livestock and took his wife as a prisoner.

⁶⁵ Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 372–379.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 172.

⁶⁷ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.—Mexican War*, 36.

Although the woman finally evaded her captors, she was emotionally distraught and “very broken down.”⁶⁸ Another example comes from the diary of Mary Maverick, who nursed Matilda Lockhart who spent two years in captivity with the Comanche. Maverick described Matilda: “Her head, arms, and face were full of bruises, and sores, and her nose was actually burnt off to the bone. The nostrils were wide open and denuded of flesh.”⁶⁹ Even though the Indians held many more prisoners at their camps, Matilda was the single captive traded back to the whites in San Antonio to gain leverage during negotiations.

In October of 1860, near the Sonoita River, an Irish settler named Johnny Ward left his Mexican wife and child behind at home as he tended to business on his farm. That afternoon, a raiding band of Apaches under the command of Cochise “rode up to the house, plundered it, and drove off a herd of cattle. They also carried away the child.”⁷⁰ There is account after account like this—with the Comanches being particularly notorious.

4. Terrorizing the Population En Route to a Safe Haven

After Victorio escaped from the reservation, he conducted relentless raiding as his band moved from New Mexico down into the northern Mexican territories to seek refuge from pursuing American forces. Once he had sufficiently outfitted his warriors and their families with the necessities of life—horses, clothing, and food supplies Victorio made peace with local Mexican shepherders and cattle ranchers who he allowed to live in constant service to his band. The owners of ranches within Victorio’s control lived in constant fear of violent raiding or retribution and therefore “came forth with anything they [the Indians] demanded and were glad to get off with their lives.”⁷¹ Victorio’s previous raiding successes and his ability to resume raiding at any time gained him and

⁶⁸ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War*, 86.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 77.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 289.

⁷¹ Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 366.

his band great power in the isolated regions of northern Mexico where neither the United States, nor Mexican authorities, possessed the skills or motivation to pursue him.

Famished and dying in the allocated Indian Territory in present day Oklahoma, Little Wolf of the Cheyenne tribe led his dilapidated band off the reservation in Indian Territory in September 1878 to march north into Canada where they might lead a better life of hunting and farming. To gain the necessary weapons and horses for the journey, he conducted raids over a thirty-mile front in Kansas with only a handful of capable warriors, while supporting the remainder of his nearly one hundred women, children, and old men. The Cheyenne remained strictly focused on their journey north and let no one block their movement. Finding horses along the way, Little Wolf ruthlessly took them, and if the white owners resisted, the Indians killed them.⁷²

D. ATROCITIES FUEL VENGEANCE

One historical point that stands out above all others is that real or imagined atrocities fueled rage, the desire for revenge, and destruction in mass quantities on all sides and by all parties. There are debates in almost every case about which side actually initiated the atrocities, but that is not important to this study. What is remarkable instead are the acts of depredation that occurred and the reactions they caused in the opposing forces.

1. Mutilation of the Slain

At the battle of Little Big Horn, Custer's 7th Cavalry was destroyed to the last man in partial retaliation for the Massacre at Sand Creek, as described previously. The first men on the scene, sent by Major Marcus Reno, found the slain Custer stripped, but not mutilated. However, the majority of the 7th was

⁷² Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 199–203.

“butchered in some manner.”⁷³ At the battle known as Fetterman’s Massacre led by Chief Red Cloud, along with Crazy Horse, the forty-seven man cavalry troop led by Fetterman was found dead “stripped, scalped, shot full of arrows and mutilated.”⁷⁴

During a raiding party into Northern Mexico, Geronimo’s mother, wife and three children were massacred and mutilated by the Mexican military.⁷⁵ This single event fueled the famous chief to hate all those who were not Indians. His rage, fueled by the desecration of his family, caused the Apache chief to slaughter upwards of ten ranchers a day while eluding the five thousand soldiers sent to try to catch him. Particularly driven to punish those who offended him, Geronimo took time in the Santa Cruz Valley after killing the workers of a small ranch to torture the rancher’s wife in front of him until the man went insane.⁷⁶

Even Indian raids against other Indians reveal the very worst brutality that men could wreak each other. In the summer of 1833, which is known in Comanche histories as “the summer that they cut off their heads,” Osage Indians from the eastern plains raided a Kiowa village of mostly women and children. The Kiowa men were away from the area at the time, likely on a raid in Mexico. The ruthless Osage raiders set the destroyed camp on fire and hacked off the heads of those they killed, stuffing them into brass buckets for the men to discover upon their return.⁷⁷

2. Treatment of Captives

Indian raiding created a psychological advantage, called the “shock of capture” in those who were unlucky enough to be taken prisoner in the course of

⁷³ Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 150.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 57.

⁷⁵ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.—Mexican War*. 132.

⁷⁶ Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*. 421–440.

⁷⁷ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.—Mexican War*. 42–43.

a raid. In one instance, after stripping a Mexican captive of his clothes, a band of Comanches tried to calm and befriend him with kind words and by showing interest in his land, neighbors, and family. Once the man calmed down and gave the Indians the intelligence they required to continue their quest for more horses and houses to raid in the surrounding area, the terrified man actually fell asleep at the feet of his captors. The Indians shot the man to death and used the information he had given them to next raid upon his house, killing his wife and children in the following days.⁷⁸

The taking of captives was also economically useful, especially for the Comanche raiders in Mexico who utilized captives to extort ransoms, perform labor, or to sell to other Indians, Mexicans, or Texans. Captured males were forced to look after the herd animals, break young horses and mules, and to make or repair saddles. Literate captives were used to read and send messages. Female captives labored in the Indian camps gathering wood, hauling water, cooking, watching children, making and repairing clothing, collecting food, and disassembling, packing, moving, and reassembling camp. Captive women also processed buffalo, and some captive women became mothers and wives in the tribe.⁷⁹

Cochise, in his struggle to remain free from reservation life, eluded the cavalry near Apache Pass in present-day Arizona. While exchanging gunfire with the cavalry in the mountains, some of his warriors were taken captive. Not to be without bargaining tools, Cochise took captive six members of a wagon train passing through his area. Stories conflict, but it appears Cochise attempted to use the prisoners to negotiate the release of his men. However, the cavalry refused the exchange so Cochise killed the six innocents on the spot. In

⁷⁸ DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.—Mexican War*. 110–111.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 90–95.

retaliation, the cavalry commander killed six of the Indian warriors held prisoner. This incident fueled Cochise and the Apaches to continue their war against the white man for another twenty-five years.⁸⁰

A final example of the treatment of captives is a description of the great Mangus Colorado's disdain for his enemies and desire to inflict pain and destroy the will of his enemy through ghastly deeds. Having captured a group of Mexicans, the men were "seized, bound to the wheel of a wagon, head downward, about eighteen inches from the ground, a fire made under them and their brains roasted from their heads. . . . The bursted heads, the agonized contortions of the facial muscles among the dead, and the terrible destiny certain to attain the living . . . were horribly depicted in my mind."⁸¹

E. RAIDING CAMPAIGN TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEEDURES

In the Indian wars, both the Indians and government forces utilized raiding techniques to gain an advantage over their adversary. For the Indians, raiding began as a style of life, more a matter of economics that was only tied into vengeance and honor as time passed and warriors were killed either by Mexicans defending their homes, or by cavalry soldiers seeking to punish tribes or to remove them from the Plains.

As noted earlier, Victorio made exemplary use of ambush tactics against forces that sometimes outnumbered his own. In case after case, cavalry leaders were duped into chasing a small band of Indian braves, only to be annihilated after crossing over a ridge or around a bend where the Indian traps were set with skill and efficiency deserving of admiration from any military tactician.

Technological advances in communications played an important role in the later stages of the Indian wars. Indians shrewdly cut the lines and downed

⁸⁰ Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 288–294.

⁸¹ From *Life Among the Apaches*, by Cremony, page 267 in Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 288.

the poles that linked the frontier forts via telegraph to increase the amount of time before cavalry reinforcements could arrive at the scene. At Fort Apache in August 1881, the Indians cut the telegraph lines and then raided the fort in an Indian uprising led by a medicine man named Nok-e-da-klinne who convinced his followers that he could bring dead Apaches back to life in order to restore their previous power on the frontier.⁸²

General George Crook, who fought the Indians extensively, chose in 1872 to pursue a punishing campaign against the Apaches in Arizona's mountainous Tonto Basin area. A key consideration for Crook was to begin the raiding campaign on November 15th. This date was set because it was the beginning of the winter season, which made it more difficult for the Indians to climb high into the mountains to evade the cavalry. In addition, the cold temperatures forced the Indians to make campfires for cooking and warmth, with the smoke giving away the position of Indian camps to Crook's scouting forces.⁸³

A significant government innovation during the Indian Wars was the cross-border agreement between the United States and Mexican governments. The Comanche, Kiowa, and especially the Apache under Geronimo enjoyed freedom of movement across the border, allowing the Indians to evade capture and direct confrontation by the United States and Mexican forces. In 1882, the United States and Mexico finally agreed to allow hot pursuit of the raiders across the international border by cavalry units. By June of that year, the entire Apache tribe to include those led by Geronimo, Nachite, and Loco surrendered to United States forces inside the borders of Mexico.⁸⁴

⁸² Wellman, *The Indian Wars of the West: Death on the Prairie, Death in the Desert*, 411–413.

⁸³ Ibid., 347.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 421–427.

IV. LAW ENFORCEMENT RAIDING

A. PURPOSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT RAIDING

Unlike raids in a purely military context, law enforcement agencies conduct raids to capture fugitives or suspects. There is no desire to damage or destroy property at the scene of the raid. It is instead more desirable to apprehend the suspect without the loss or damage of evidence, which proves critical to the suspect's prosecution in the criminal justice system. Law enforcement agencies exist to protect citizens. Raiding in this context is overshadowed by the need for safety and the importance of due process during the development of the case, execution of the raid, and in conducting the prosecution of the suspect.

Raiding as a tactic is actually a last resort when it comes to fugitive apprehension by law enforcement in the United States. Raiding has a propensity to cause an excited reaction in those whom the raid targets, and therefore poses significant risk to both the officers conducting the raid as well as innocent members of the fugitive's family, neighbors, or passersby.⁸⁵ For this reason, raids are conducted only when safer, less intrusive, more peaceful methods are ruled out due to issues of timeliness, the situation, or circumstances.⁸⁶ When raiding is necessary, law enforcement officers use successful techniques and procedures that have been shown to produce results.

⁸⁵ Radley Balko, *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America* (Washington D.C.: The CATO Institute, 2006). 19–20.

⁸⁶ Dino Bardoni. Personal interview with the author conducted in Salinas, California. Commander Bardoni has 26 years of experience in investigative and SWAT police work, and is currently the city's SWAT team commander. Mr. Bardoni is also the director of the Monterey County Joint Gang Task Force. Interview conducted 13 April 2009.

B. PRINCIPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT RAIDING

Law enforcement raiding follows a development and planning path similar to military raids so that it seems safe to say they share similar principles that result in success even though the context in which raids are conducted is different. The principles of raiding for law enforcement units are intelligence, surprise, security, patience, speed, and safety.

1. Intelligence

The planning of a law enforcement raid begins with intelligence. Extensive legal requirements placed on law enforcement units in the United States with respect to the Fourth Amendment require that entry into houses or businesses be based on solid and verified information. Raiding a private dwelling is a risky undertaking that possibly requires the use of force and poses a high potential for disaster with respect to civil rights, as well as with regard to the investigation. “The investigative success and the tactical success are mutually interdependent.”⁸⁷

Law enforcement officers simultaneously build the case against the suspect for prosecution as well as develop the required pre-raid intelligence that allows for a successful apprehension of the fugitive. Intelligence is categorized into three areas: “that pertaining to the suspect, that pertaining to the target location, and that pertaining to external influences.”⁸⁸ This three-part intelligence estimate is simpler than the acronym-strewn method for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) in the military system and serves to focus the investigating officer’s efforts. Investigators, who eventually also conduct the capturing operation, accumulate as much information as possible about the suspect, his patterns of life, likely target locations, as well as those outside influences that

⁸⁷ Paul T. Mahoney, *Narcotics Investigation Techniques* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, 1992). 163.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 164.

may affect the suspect and his actions at the targeted locations. The critical factor driving the timing of the operation is executing the raid so that evidence is recovered and the suspect is prosecuted.⁸⁹ Significant intelligence gathering must be conducted to ensure the target is arrestable, that sufficient evidence exists to prosecute the suspect, and that conducting the raid is the most effective method of apprehending the individual.⁹⁰

2. Surprise

Surprise is a critical element of the law enforcement raid. Law enforcement officers seek to avoid being surprised when they conduct raids, but they also desire to surprise the suspect, which helps provide an element of safety for the raiding force. Limitations on the legal timing of search warrants may preclude officers from conducting raids during hours of limited visibility, when suspects are most likely home and sleeping, which is when military raiders prefer to strike. In some areas, laws limit the execution of search warrants to between the hours of 7:00 A.M. and 10:00 P.M. This is why many warrants are reported as having been executed right at 7:01 A.M., with suspects caught at their residence after sleeping there at night.⁹¹

Law enforcement must gain the element of surprise through tactics. Entry methods are one way that law enforcement officers gain surprise. Using breaching tools or explosives, SWAT teams may gain entry to a suspect's dwelling before he or she can react to the appearance of the officers. Officers can also make entry by methods other than force. Having uniformed police approach the residence as if there has been a normal call for assistance is one method of subterfuge that may get a suspect to open the door without realizing a

⁸⁹ Mahoney, *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 165.

⁹⁰ Bardoni.

⁹¹ Ibid.

raid is imminent. Another indirect raiding method is to approach the location covertly and then enter the building when the door is opened as someone else enters or exits.⁹²

3. Security

In law enforcement raiding, the main threat to the raiding force comes from the target building.⁹³ In contrast to military raids behind enemy lines, there usually is no enemy ambushing force, reserve, or counter-attacking forces to deal with. Security in the law enforcement context requires sufficient personnel and resources to adequately block fugitive escape from the targeted location, as well as prevent the suspect from preparing for the arrival of the raiding force. Most suspects will flee if given the opportunity during a raid, which causes additional security problems for the force and for the surrounding population. However, rules of engagement for use of deadly force by law officers do not allow an escape route to be “covered by fires” as such routes would be covered in a military raid.⁹⁴ Rather, law enforcement raids utilize a technique of inner and outer perimeter security to prevent suspects from fleeing the scene.⁹⁵

Inner security personnel are dedicated to deal with the specific circumstances of the raided location, while outer security personnel both contain the objective and prevent outside elements from approaching. Inner security personnel attempt to sort out individuals and assign evidence to people found on the target. Assigning evidence such as guns or drugs to specific individuals on the premises greatly increases the chances of achieving a successful prosecution. Outer security personnel must be prepared to quickly identify, pursue, and apprehend lookouts before they can alert suspects to the approach

⁹² Mahoney. *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 200.

⁹³ Bardoni.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Mahoney. *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 185.

of police officers.⁹⁶ Additionally, outer security must prevent anyone from entering or leaving the area, so as to protect citizens as well as to block the escape of wanted persons.

4. Patience

Patience is a principle of the law enforcement raid because of the many outside factors that must be considered. First, at the outset of the raid process the investigator must gather huge amounts of information through various means. Getting tips from informants, checking the reliability of those informants, talking to beat cops who know the area, setting up and recording surveillance on suspects and locations, identifying associates, and researching their past behaviors can require weeks, months, or even years before a suspect can be actively pursued. Pre-raid intelligence is critical to developing a probable cause package, which allows the investigator to secure a search warrant, and then inform his executing teams about the background of the case.⁹⁷ To determine where a target is best apprehended the investigator must also consider the physical location of the raid. Is it close to a school, daycare facility, or a busy street where pedestrian traffic is high? All of these factors go into determining the best time, method, and location of apprehension. From the very beginning to the possibly non-climactic end of the raid, officers must remain patient and vigilant to react to changing information and conditions.

5. Speed

Counter-intuitive as it may seem, acting with speed goes hand in hand with being patient. Both speed and patience are required to protect innocent bystanders, officers involved in the raid, as well as to ensure that the most accurate, complete, and thus effective investigation is conducted. Law enforcement utilizes speed at the tactical level to reduce the possibility of a

⁹⁶ Mahoney. *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 185–186.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 164–173.

hostile standoff.⁹⁸ Tactical speed is also critical in ensuring that the suspects are caught with the associated evidence of their crimes. This is especially important when dealing with drug offenders who may destroy evidence very quickly once they have been alerted to an impending raid on their location.⁹⁹ When to strike, meanwhile, requires strategic use of speed. If a suspect is located, but is known to move from safe-house to safe-house, then the officers must react with haste and conduct a speedy raid upon the known location in order to have their best chance of apprehension.

6. Safety

Safety is perhaps the greatest consideration for law enforcement raids. In a chapter dedicated to raid planning and execution, Sergeant Paul Mahoney describes the particular details of law enforcement raiding from start to finish. Every step, from investigation to prosecution, is conducted either directly or indirectly for safety's sake.¹⁰⁰

During pre-raid intelligence collection, the investigator collects volumes of details on the suspect, location, and external factors so that he can first devise the safest and most effective time, method, and location by which to apprehend the fugitive. Investigators bear in mind the safety of the raiding force, of the fugitive and his associates, as well as that of the surrounding population. Intelligence collection serves to identify all hazards that may be associated with a suspect at the particular time and location where the raid will be executed, again to provide the greatest measure of safety for those who will conduct the operation.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Bardoni.

⁹⁹ Mahoney, *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 165, 184–185.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 164–181.

Prior to conducting the raid, numerous documents are prepared to help ensure the safety of the force and the population.¹⁰² Relevant intelligence products along with sketches, photos, diagrams, and videotapes are compiled into the probable cause package. The probable cause package adds to safety in two ways: First, in the context of due process and the Fourth Amendment, it protects the general public from the police raiding houses unnecessarily without proper oversight and authorizations. Second, the probable cause package serves as the one-stop document for team members so that everyone is familiar with the case prior to execution of the raid. In situations where multiple teams are brought together to conduct a raid for a specific investigation, this information is extremely important in providing the necessary background so that officers conducting the raid can make informed and justified decisions, especially when using deadly force.

Safety is especially critical during execution of the operation. Dino Bardoni, with 26 years of experience in police investigative work, suggests that a peaceful resolution to high-risk situations is always best.¹⁰³ Given that the goal of the tactical raid is to seize suspects with incriminating evidence and to do so with the minimum risk to the force and the population, all details such as the approach, entry, team communications, uniforms, and contingencies are covered prior to the raid to minimize risk to officers and to protect the community.¹⁰⁴

C. RAIDING AGAINST GANGS AND DRUG CARTELS

1. Gangs are Similar to Terrorist Groups

Street gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha (also known as MS-13), the Bloods, Crips, Norteños, Sorteños and others are similar to terrorist

¹⁰² Mahoney, *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*.

¹⁰³ Bardoni.

¹⁰⁴ Mahoney. *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 181.

organizations. What the definition of a gang is, is much debated in the literature about gangs, but two accepted definitions that bear resemblance to definitions of terror groups are Frederic Thrasher's:

The gang is an interstitial group originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated through conflict. It is characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting face to face, milling, movement through space as a unit, conflict, and planning. The result of this collective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment to a local territory.¹⁰⁵

And Walter Miller's definition:

A youth gang is a self-formed association of peers, bound together by mutual interests, with identifiable leadership, well-developed lines of authority, and other organizational features, who act in concert to achieve a specific purpose or purposes which generally include the conduct of illegal activity and control of a particular territory, facility, or type of enterprise.¹⁰⁶

These two definitions echo many concepts cited by Marc Sageman in his book *Understanding Terror Networks* about members of the Global Salafi Jihad. Sageman posits that Global Salafi Jihad members share the following traits: First, they belong to the Jihad for the purpose of "social affiliation through friendship, kinship, and discipleship." Next, members undergo a "progressive intensification" of their beliefs which leads them to accept and devote their lives to the salafi jihadist ideology. Lastly, members are formally accepted through a link (some other person) who is already in the jihad. Sageman points out that social bonds are the critical element in joining the group together since these provide "mutual emotional and social support, identity, and encouragement." He

¹⁰⁵ Kimberly Tobin. *Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective*. (Pearson—Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ: 2008). 18.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 20.

reinforces this fact by stating that the “in-group love” between members of the group is the sticky glue that holds the members together and intensely motivates their desire to belong.¹⁰⁷

Terrorists and gang members join their respective organizations for social reasons. One theory of gang membership states that people join gangs because of their need for peer group identification, which correlates directly with Sageman’s identification of the jihad organizations’ important social function.¹⁰⁸ Gangs also provide a set of internally respected values and confer status on those who most stringently dedicate themselves to the deviant values of the gang ideology.¹⁰⁹ Members in good standing are willing to engage in the violent actions of turf defense, homicide, assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery and assault, arson, intimidation, robbery, forcible rape, kidnapping, vandalism, burglary, larceny, and drug trafficking.¹¹⁰

Further evidence of the social networking aspect of gang membership and its close similarity to membership in terrorist organizations is revealed in the development of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS–13) in inner city Los Angeles in the 1980s. As Salvadoran immigrants settled into the low income neighborhoods of Los Angeles, they became victims of crime at the hands of mostly Mexican street gangs. In an attempt to protect themselves and their Salvadorian identity, young men grouped together in *maras* or “posses” to protect their family and friends. Eventually these newly formed gangs adopted a wide range of illegal money-making ventures and grew increasingly violent as a way to enforce in-group loyalty and their pecking order. The more violent the gang member the higher

¹⁰⁷ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 135.

¹⁰⁸ Kimberly Tobin, *Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson–Prentice Hall, 2008). 57–58.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹¹⁰ Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Urban Street Gang Enforcement* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1997) (accessed 2 April 2009). 30.

and faster in the gang leadership that individual rose.¹¹¹ This ascension and assimilation of violent, dedicated, and socially tied together individuals mimics what is found in Global Salafi Jihad groups. Ayman al Zawahiri, for instance, rose to the ranks of leadership in Al Qaeda through his dedication to the jihadi cause begun in the 1980s against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Through his sanction of increasingly violent operations and radical interpretations of Islam he progressed to the top of an organization he helped create.

2. Who Conducts Law Enforcement Raids in the U.S.?

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams formed in local, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies conduct most raids in the United States. After their conceptual development in the 1960s, SWAT teams and techniques ballooned in the 1980s, thanks to increased funding, the development of more specialized equipment, and greater legal authorization for paramilitary police techniques from the federal government.¹¹²

Salinas, California, which is a central Californian city of approximately 150,000 permanent residents and an additional 50,000 transient, migratory farm workers, employs a SWAT team consisting of 22 personnel. The team is broken into two sections, each led by an experienced police sergeant with from 8 to 12 years of law enforcement experience. The Salinas SWAT team specially selects officers from within the police force. First, every member of the SWAT team must be a volunteer and must receive recommendations from his superiors regarding his past performance. Prospective members are then tested and must continually maintain increased physical fitness standards and must demonstrate above average proficiency with both their service pistol and assault rifles in situational exercises called stress shoots. Finally, a selection board consisting of

¹¹¹ Arian Campo-Flores, "The most Dangerous Gang in America," *Newsweek*, 2005, (accessed 6 April 2009).

¹¹² Balko, *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America*, 4–5.

the SWAT team commander and sergeants interviews each SWAT candidate.¹¹³ Following selection and assignment to the SWAT unit, each officer must, by law, take basic and advanced skills development courses in a continuous learning system that balances executing the SWAT mission with training in order to maintain and increase proficiency.¹¹⁴ This means the Salinas SWAT team can be considered an elite unit of volunteers selected for their performance and potential to perform under difficult conditions, as well as in intense situations where skills and good judgment are critical to success. This is very similar to the selection process and criteria of any Special Operations unit in the United States Military.

3. The Investigation

“Raiding someone’s private domain for the purpose of executing a search warrant is implicitly risky.”¹¹⁵ The investigative preparation required to do so, as previously indicated, is undoubtedly the most important part of what is often a long process. The investigation sets the stage for successful conduct of the raid, and the successful conduct of the raid allows the investigation to continue with booking, prosecution, and sentencing.¹¹⁶

Maximizing the likelihood of capturing the suspect with sufficient evidence to charge and convict him in the courts is an extremely important point that must not be overlooked when comparing law enforcement raids conducted against gang criminals to those conducted against terrorists who many say should be prosecuted in the national criminal justice system.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Bardoni.

¹¹⁴ California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST), *SWAT Operational Guidelines and Standardized Training Recommendations*, 2005) (accessed 6 April 2009). 1.

¹¹⁵ Mahoney, *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 163.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 163.

¹¹⁷ Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 176.

As with the military's Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, all sources of intelligence are collected. Law enforcement agencies rely significantly on human intelligence (HUMINT) in the form of confidential informants, undercover officers, and data culled from databases of gang and gang member information collected from within and across jurisdictions.¹¹⁸ Police agencies have the capability to conduct some limited signals intelligence (SIGINT) when targeting gang members whose phone information is known, but these resources are limited and legal barriers to conduct wiretapping are significant. Additionally, with the advent of popular television shows and movies disclosing law enforcement and military procedures, well-informed gang members change their phones or phone numbers to avoid technical detection or eavesdropping by the authorities.¹¹⁹ Video image intelligence (IMINT) is in high demand and cameras are often emplaced at fixed locations to capture video footage in high crime areas and places where gang activity is most frequently reported. Video surveillance cameras from private or public sources are frequently utilized to garner photos of suspects who have transited through an area prior to or after committing crimes.¹²⁰

Prior to conducting a raid, law enforcement personnel must prove to a judge the veracity of the intelligence they have collected in order to receive the search warrant required. This detailed, and sometimes legally exhausting, approach to developing intelligence should be more fully appreciated and considered for implementation by military forces tasked with capturing terrorists. If, or as, terrorism is re-criminalized and terrorists are accorded rights and due processes afforded to citizens, law enforcement processes are worth studying for a variety of reasons. First, they will help increase the likelihood of capturing the suspected terrorist. Secondly, this process minimizes the likelihood of collateral

¹¹⁸ Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Urban Street Gang Enforcement*, 37.

¹¹⁹ Bardoni.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

damage to innocents. Lastly, following tried and tested law enforcement techniques for developing prosecutable intelligence will ensure that terrorists, when caught are then prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

4. The Raids

a. The Surround and Call-out

Law enforcement raids fall into two categories: the instantaneous situation and the deliberately planned event.¹²¹ The instantaneous raid results from an event occurring in the community, such as a barricaded shooter, or when officers chase a suspect to a private residence where the suspect then gains the upper hand by holing up in a defensive posture. The instantaneous situation will most likely be handled by what law enforcement teams call a “surround and call-out.”¹²² In contrast, the deliberately planned raid event is just that, as has been described in previous sections.

The surround and call-out is a raiding technique that could be used by military forces. The basic premise of this technique is to surround the residence with both an inner and outer perimeter and then utilize a crisis negotiator to attempt to resolve the stand-off peacefully.¹²³ In this manner, the law enforcement raiders are able to avoid the most dangerous portion of the raid, which is the actual breach and entry into the home. Some variations on the “surround and call-out” theme consist of escalating force by using diversionary devices, actual lethal force, or chemicals such as smoke, tear gas, or pepper spray devices. These chemical munitions irritate the occupants of the building and render them less capable of inflicting harm on the raiding force and make them more likely to negotiate a peaceful surrender.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Bardoni.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

The strengths of this method are safety for the officers and the suspects involved in the incident. By avoiding a gunfight at nearly all costs officers, suspects, and bystanders are much safer than if the raiding force makes a dynamic entry. This method is especially useful when law enforcement officers are required to knock and announce their presence prior to entry of a residence. The knock and announce requirement as stipulated in many search warrants alerts the criminal fugitive to the impending raid and forfeits the element of surprise.¹²⁵ This makes the surround and call-out technique a lifesaver. Additionally, the use of chemical munitions such as smoke, tear gas, and pepper spray help preserve life at the scene of the raid by eliminating the need for a gunfight.

The drawbacks to the surround and call-out technique are that it takes a significant force to surround an average residence and all its escape routes. Additionally, the call-out technique requires time to be successful. On a normal inner city street, the police can sit and wait out a fugitive for as long as necessary to negotiate a peaceful surrender. However, for a military unit in an enemy sanctuary, time may not be available to execute this method. Lastly, the escalation of force using chemical munitions to force the surrender of suspected terrorists in a military setting is frowned upon, if not banned outright. This is due to poorly worded or interpreted rules of war related to the Geneva conventions, and a lack of clear and congruent U.S. policy on the use of tear gas with respect to these treaties.¹²⁶ This is ironic, of course, given the likelihood that riot crowd control munitions actually save lives when used in the raid scenario.

b. The Dynamic Entry

The dynamic entry raid is similar to the military style raid in that escape routes from the suspect's location are isolated and then a forced entry is

¹²⁵ Balko, *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America*, 32.

¹²⁶ Nicholas Wade and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. use of Tear Gas could Violate Treaty, Critics Say," *The New York Times*. 2003.

made upon the residence. The reasons for conducting a forced entry are to gain “superiority of personnel and firepower, swiftness of execution, the element of surprise, and security of the inner and outer perimeters.”¹²⁷ The method of entry depends on three factors: first, where the target location is barricaded or fortified against entry; second, where the suspect has a violent history or is likely armed and willing to fight the raiding force; third, where the arrest of the suspect away from the location is not possible, and it is likely that the suspect will destroy incriminating evidence upon realization that a raid is imminent.¹²⁸

Entry teams may use battering rams, pry bars, hooligan tools, trucks with log chains, shotgun breaches, and even explosive charges to gain entry into suspect locations.¹²⁹ These manual breaching techniques may be effective for experienced users and in situations where barricades or reinforced entries are not expected. However, in cases where the location may be fortified, the use of explosive charges provides a breach as well as shock and surprise, and this may reduce organized resistance against the entering force.¹³⁰

Upon entry into the raided location, officers clear rooms and secure personnel on the premises as they encounter them. Officers subdue any threats to the raiding force prior to conducting detailed searches of the building. The investigating officers are responsible for planning and executing the “handling of prisoners, processing of paperwork and prisoner transportation.”¹³¹ Sergeant Mahoney of the Denver Police Department recommends having a female officer on hand to search female prisoners on target.¹³² This serves to prevent the appearance or the perception of any improprieties, while also ensuring that

¹²⁷ Mahoney, *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 184–185.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 186–187. and Patrick J. Fiorilli, *Explosive Entry Policy* (Lakewood, Ohio: Westshore Enforcement Bureau SWAT, 2009). 1.

¹³⁰ Mahoney, *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 186–187.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 191.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 190.

female suspects are searched thoroughly. In many cases, males are uncomfortable searching female suspects, and fail to find critical evidence. After the building is secure, investigators can take their time in searching the premises, documenting the evidence found on site, and conducting preliminary questioning of personnel at or near the location. Conducting a thorough investigation at the scene of the raid is especially important for the prosecution of captured suspects.

These principles of entry and investigation are directly applicable to military raids. Utilizing the most high tech dynamic entry methods allows the raiders to gain the element of surprise, which is vitally important to the success of raids. Searching and investigation techniques learned from law enforcement may be used against terrorist suspects to ensure evidence is collected and prosecution possibilities are maximized. Lastly, during raids in Middle Eastern countries, the treatment of women is highly scrutinized, and involving female soldiers to search women found at the target site may prevent negative reactions from local authorities.

c. Subterfuge and other Entry Methods

Alternatives to forced entry give the raiding force flexibility. When commanders identify that the forced entry of a building is not possible, or the consequences would be unacceptable due to the likelihood of damage or inciting violence, officers should consider using subterfuge or other scams in order to gain access to the target building. Some suspects may be caught off guard by entering behind someone with whom they are familiar. Once the familiar person opens the door to the residence, the raiding force will hold the door open and enter behind the unwitting or witting third party. Having a confidential informant to conduct this action provides a definite advantage to the raiding force, although the use of that informant in future cases would then be jeopardized.¹³³

¹³³ Mahoney, *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 200.

Another method for capturing a suspect when the chances for successful entry are not likely or too dangerous is simply to not enter. The raiding force may choose to conduct surveillance on the target location and then capture the suspect as or after he or she leaves the building. Where the surrounding population is subject to unacceptable danger, it may be better to watch the suspect and then conduct a mobile raid on his vehicle at a location that is more permissible. This scenario works well if it is likely that the suspect will react violently to a raid on his house. In this way the police still choose the location of the raid, are able to detain their suspect, and maintain the possibility to enter the targeted premises with the suspect in custody to gain additional physical evidence as required.¹³⁴ These alternate methods may be a more effective, although not necessarily efficient, technique for detaining suspects while protecting the population and the police force.¹³⁵

These methods are also useful for military forces operating in foreign countries. Using alternative methods of entry and capture may alleviate news headlines that condemn America's willingness to kill innocents and damage civil structures. Additionally, fugitives that are captured by less violent methods may be more likely to provide information, especially when their household was not destroyed by his captors.

5. Prosecution and Follow-up Law Enforcement Against Gangs

Capturing gang members in raids presents slightly different challenges than capturing other kinds of suspects. Traditional laws regarding drug trafficking, homicide, assault with a weapon, robbery, home invasion, arson, extortion, witness intimidation, and theft obviously apply to gang related suspects, but innovative law enforcement initiatives also complement these traditional "tools." Two of these provisions are: "(1) laws directed at gangs and gang members and

¹³⁴ Mahoney, *Narcotics Investigation Techniques*, 200. and Bardoni.

¹³⁵ Bardoni.

(2) laws providing for enhanced punishment for crimes . . .”¹³⁶ Apprehending someone on a racketeering charge is one prosecutorial method that carries with it stiff penalties. Additionally, specific gang laws criminalize gang acts themselves as “separate, substantive” crimes that are separate and in addition to more traditional crimes. Other enhancements include extended sentences for “possessing a firearm, committing a crime in a school or other protected zone, and furthering gang ties or motives.”¹³⁷ It is also possible to outlaw membership in specific gangs. Concurrent with laws targeting gang activities directly are enhanced punishments. These can automatically add minimum sentence requirements for gang related crimes.¹³⁸

The earlier a prosecutor becomes involved with gang-related investigations, raids, and arrests, the more likely it is a successful prosecution will result. Prosecutors who are brought into the planning process for deliberate raids can assist in preparing search warrants, advising and seeking legal authority for the use of electronic surveillance, and selecting the charges most likely to result in successful prosecution and long term incarceration.¹³⁹

Some big cities have specialized prosecution offices devoted to gang crimes or even to specific gangs.¹⁴⁰ Vertical prosecution refers to situations where the prosecuting attorney is trained in, and devoted full-time to, gang matters, and is responsible for the case from start to finish. Prosecutors dedicated to gang cases become attuned to the culture, personality, and “guns-and-drugs economy of the street gang.”¹⁴¹ With sufficient knowledge, these attorneys are able to understand the street jargon gang members use during

¹³⁶ Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Urban Street Gang Enforcement*, 83.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 94.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 83–85.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

questioning, which results in subjects revealing more information than they intended, especially since, to the gang member, the prosecutor surely appears ignorant of the true meaning behind gang sayings or symbols.¹⁴²

Following through with prosecution of gang members and publicizing the stiff penalties associated with gang-related crimes helps convince the public that the police can conduct meaningful raids. As long as the raids inflict reasonable (meaning acceptable) levels of violence and do not alienate the public, plus so long as they result in successful prosecution of the targeted criminals, then law enforcement agencies are considered effective and retain the public's trust and confidence.¹⁴³ These prosecution techniques may be used effectively against terrorists if similar laws are adopted and terrorists are convicted of their wrong doings in court and then sentenced accordingly. In this way, raiding against terrorist enemies may be made to seem worthwhile and less intrusive to the protected population.

D. PROBLEMS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT RAIDS

1. Problems with Raid Execution

Forced entry style raids conducted in the U.S. can cause a media firestorm, such as the debacle at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas or the tragedy that occurred at Ruby Ridge, in Idaho. Local raids often lead to considerable scrutiny by local newspapers. The libertarian think tank, The CATO Institute, makes a case for reducing what Radley Balko calls "paramilitary police raids."¹⁴⁴ Balko cites five major problems with raids, but limits most of his argument to raiding in the execution of drug warrants.

¹⁴¹ Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Urban Street Gang Enforcement*, 73.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Bardoni.

¹⁴⁴ Balko, *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America*.

In general, critics of raiding condemn the tactic as the militarization of civilian policing.¹⁴⁵ However, comparing the requirement for the military to “seek out, overpower, and destroy an enemy” to the police requirement of “keeping the peace” is an unfair comparison.¹⁴⁶ Sharing techniques and networking between military and civilian law enforcement can only serve to improve both organizations. Collaboration allows leaders from all agencies to learn and appreciate the differences and similarities between military and law enforcement operations while incorporating new ideas, frameworks, and guidelines thanks to increased cross-talk.¹⁴⁷ As long as each organization stays true to its assigned purposes and ethics, collaboration should be of considerable national benefit.

Yes, raiding may cause an escalation in violence.¹⁴⁸ This critique is fair, and as pointed out in both the literature and in an interview with an experienced SWAT commander, investigating officers desire to apprehend suspects using the absolute minimum of force required. This not only protects the officers who execute the apprehension, but also preserves the lives of suspects, their families, associates, and especially the innocent bystanders who happen to be near the raid location. Indeed, the use of the surround and call-out technique avoids the requirement for officers to forcefully enter residences, which Balko cites as a major contributor to retaliatory violence by either armed suspects or innocent civilians protecting households.¹⁴⁹

Another criticism has to do with raids executed at the wrong place because police “relied on information from confidential informants.”¹⁵⁰ Without question, disastrous consequences result from raiding the wrong location where

¹⁴⁵ Balko, *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America*.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁴⁷ Dan Tapscoff and Anthony D. Williams, *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything*, 2nd ed. (New York, New York: Portfolio by the Penguin Group, 2008). 3.

¹⁴⁸ Balko, *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America*, 19.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 19–21.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 21.

otherwise innocent civilians take up arms against forceful entry. However, this does not occur when there is a thorough police investigation prior to the conduct of an operation. Utilizing the general principles outlined above, and always being skeptical of and corroborating all tips and information received from informants prevents police or military forces from making such mistakes. In other words, sufficient corroboration of intelligence through multiple sources and the patient pursuit of suspects at a time and place where the probability of capture is highest renders this a inaccurate criticism.¹⁵¹

2. Problems with Raiding Policy

Some criticize raiding, believing it to be only a defensive or reactionary measure.¹⁵² Yet, consider the State of Florida's Gang Reduction Strategy. It identifies the strength of gangs to be "their ability to attract a continual stream of young recruits to their ranks."¹⁵³ Florida's strategy to combat this gang enemy focuses on three pillars. The first pillar consists of prevention and intervention. The second concentrates on law enforcement objectives. The third pillar focuses on rehabilitation and re-entry. Only two of the seven law enforcement objectives specify arresting gang members, while the remaining five concentrate on prosecution techniques and priorities.¹⁵⁴

1. Compile a statewide priority list and target every major criminal gang in Florida for dismantling by arresting and prosecuting gang leaders and key gang members.

2. Identify and target for arrest and prosecution all gang kingpins in Florida and seek life imprisonment sentences.

¹⁵¹ Bardoni.

¹⁵² David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 288.

¹⁵³ Bill McCollum, *Florida Gang Reduction Strategy 2008–2012* (Tallahassee, Florida: Attorney General's Office of the State of Florida, 2008). 10.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

3. Prioritize the prosecution of gun crimes related to gangs and gang members and target for prosecution those who provide guns to juvenile gang members ineligible to own or possess a gun.
4. In areas of intense gang activity, build community policing, remove firearms from low to mid-level gang members and use injunctive powers to prohibit gang members from gathering.
5. Improve intelligence gathering and information sharing on gangs and gang members and their activities among and between federal, state, and local law enforcement, prosecuting authorities, schools and Juvenile Justice, Corrections, and Children and Families officials.
6. Strengthen gang law enforcement and prosecution with more uniform, specialized training and designate one Assistant State Attorney in each judicial circuit whose sole, full-time responsibility is to prosecute and manage the prosecution of gangs, gang members and gang-related crimes.
7. Coordinate federal, state and local law enforcement / prosecution efforts toward the common objective of combating gang activity in Florida, including setting priorities and targeting certain gangs, gang activities and gang-related prosecutions all over Florida.

Of the remaining eleven objectives under the other pillars, none reference arresting current gang members.¹⁵⁵

As is true for any effective counter-insurgency plan, the majority of efforts will center on protecting the population and preventing the gangs (insurgents) from recruiting and maintaining their membership.¹⁵⁶ This makes raiding an instrumental part of the overall campaign plan, but it should not be the sole focus of every agency dedicated to helping solve the problem.

¹⁵⁵ Bill McCollum, *Florida Gang Reduction Strategy 2008-2012*, 10–12.

¹⁵⁶ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* 288–289.

Finally, Balko cites a general lack of accountability or liability on the part of police agencies that make mistakes in conjunction with forced entry raids.¹⁵⁷ But this, too, is a problem that is not overly difficult to fix. By applying extreme diligence to the investigation, selection, and prosecution of raided targets, raiding forces can stay on the moral high ground and thereby maintain public support. The raiding force can display its high ethical standards and professional conduct by demonstrating to the public that extensive controls are in place to limit the damage and destruction inflicted during raids. These measures may include tighter standards for search warrants (or tighter standards for target selection by military units), additional transparency measures such as videotaping raids, and possibly implementing review boards to determine why excessive force was used on botched or controversial raids.¹⁵⁸ These measures would not only serve to protect the victims of botched raids, but they also publicize and reinforce the positive aspects of raiding as suspects are apprehended in a controlled, professional, and humane manner.

¹⁵⁷ Balko, *Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America*, 41.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 41–42.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this project has been to examine the value of conducting special commando raids in order to achieve strategic gains against a networked enemy in the Global War on Terrorism. It is intended to explore what kinds of raids are strategically useful, how different agencies conduct raids, and what techniques exist that result in strategic gains.

1. On Raiding

Raids conducted by specialized units can closely scrutinize the use of violence, reducing incidents of collateral damage and affording investigators and intelligence analysts the ability to more thoroughly investigate terrorists and their operating environment for further exploitation. Commando raids also allow us to capture rather than just kill our adversaries.

The psychological gains associated with raids may prove valuable in winning the information battle with terrorists in another sense. By penetrating their world, we send a meaningful psychological message. This has the potential to influence local and regional audiences as well as the American public, thereby ensuring that raids continue to be a boon to our strategy rather than attracting negative media scrutiny or raising public concerns about military methods, motives, or morals.

Raids are a critical aspect of disrupting terrorist operations worldwide. Utilizing proven raiding principles will ensure tactical success by helping us deny terrorists safe sanctuary. But shaping perceptions about raids must be considered as well, in order to ensure the long term success of our grand strategy. The United States should exploit successful raids in the information domain by maximizing the strategic gain won by each operation. Successful

raids should then drive our ability to develop additional timely and accurate intelligence. This intelligence, quickly rolled into target packages and executed by ethically competent and tactically capable forces will assist the United States in defeating terrorist organizations. The continued ability and national will to conduct audacious, long-range raids will be especially important as the open conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan dissipate, and the world returns to more “peace-like” political conditions.

2. Lessons from the Indian Raids

Looking at historical accounts of the Indian raids teaches us important lessons for raiding in the future. It may be necessary to kill a large number of the enemy in order to defeat his will to fight. Effective raiding requires that an extremely accurate and discriminating use of force be delegated to commandos who then accept the responsibility to make life or death choices on a person-by-person basis at the very last second. The discriminating use of force in raids compares favorably with the gratuitous and arbitrary violence perpetrated by terrorists. But, it also compares favorably with what is inadvertently achieved by air strikes conducted against the same targets, where the likelihood of collateral damage is higher without eyes-on, ground level intelligence—which a raiding party is more likely to be able to gather in person on site. In this comparison of what causes least harm to innocents, the United States’ image in any society that values life will be boosted to higher levels.

It is important to treat civilians, as well as captured enemy personnel, with humanity. Maintaining the moral high ground through proper treatment of detainees and prisoners is critically important to our image of ourselves, to our allies and, most importantly, to the population where and for whom we fight.

As we look to historical cases to find ways to improve current techniques, the effect of atrocities on both sides in the Indian Wars should serve as a constant reminder of why it is so important to place ethical treatment of detainees at the top of our list of priorities. This simple maxim could mean the difference

between someone joining the jihad or joining us. Individual informants who know the details of secret plots could hold exactly the information that authorities require to prevent future terrorist attacks.

Taking family members captive, as the Plains Indians did so frequently, may be a logical, humane way to force terrorists to surrender. While the ill-treatment of women and children held by Indian captors should not be our model, using family members to compel outlaws to the bargaining table may be useful to preserve life on a larger scale. This technique may be in violation of the current laws of warfare but, like all laws, they should be periodically examined and possibly amended.

Finally, the ruthless cavalry techniques used against the Indians may be justified, in some cases, when it is required to kill your enemy and defeat his way of life in order to preserve your own. Ideally, this should never again seem to be necessary, but in dealing with people who believe their atrocities are justified by a higher power, such as salafi jihadists, this may be more applicable than most Americans realize.

3. Lessons from Law Enforcement Raids

Law enforcement raids provide an example of methods that should be considered for use in military applications against terrorists. The principles common to military and police raiding suggest that there are certain techniques both can use. For instance, lessons learned through countering gangs in America may be applied to counter-terrorism operations around the world in the form of raid tactics, as well as prosecution techniques and legal code refinements.

Incorporating law enforcement investigation methods may prove beneficial to raid planners in military organizations. So could using police style entry methods. Most law enforcement methods serve to increase the safety of raids for both the raider and the defender, so certainly in any situation involving

civilians, these methods should be supported because they preserve life. Of particular use may be riot control devices, such as tear gas, to increase the probability that standoffs between military forces and surrounded terrorist suspects may be negotiated to a peaceful end.

Lastly, the historic and ongoing criticism of how raids are conducted on American soil should be taken into consideration, and methods developed to allay critics' concerns should be adapted by the military when it finds itself in similar situations. For instance, videotaping raids ensures raiders adhere to rules of conduct, and provides unequivocal transparency when locals make false accusations against the raiding force. These should be seen as tools to increase the public's willingness to accept raiding methods and results. Additionally, ensuring that informant information is correct, and using the minimum force required, are principles of investigation that should guide military planners.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

This thesis represents a first attempt to collate raiding best practices for the War on Terrorism. There is room to investigate a number of specific raids in both the military and law enforcement arenas to analyze what might be learned that can be used for raids against terrorists. Some specific instances that warrant study are the failed raid at the Branch Davidian Compound in Waco, Texas, as well as investigation into any number of aerial bombings against terrorist suspects along the Afghanistan—Pakistan border. These types of cases could be studied in terms of whether the operations were successful in the realm of the strategic goals of the campaign even if they failed tactically, and what the perceptions of these operations were at the time and what effects those perceptions have had on future operations.

Additionally, there should be a doctrinal review undertaken in order to examine more fully the plans and techniques for conducting raids across the United States Department of Defense. Each branch of the service has a concept for raiding. However, it seems unlikely one definition would sufficiently describe

all available raiding methods. There might be much to be learned by comparing methods across the services, as well as their measures of success, particularly when it comes to the viability of employing these methods and measures of success against a terrorist enemy.

Bruce Hoffman's work on commando raids, for instance, serves as an interesting model to be expanded on in modern times. His study covered raids from 1946 to 1983 and judged them according to his specific principles for success. A study of modern raids from 1989 to the present, assessed against the same—or perhaps new—criteria could lead to interesting and surprising conclusions about the effectiveness of raids since the end of the cold war.

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